Taking and sharing photos is a routine practice in childcare institutions, used to document children’s learning, communicate with families, and support marketing. These practices are typically regulated through consent forms, the institutional mechanism for authorizing photography and media use. While prior research has examined parents’ photo-taking and sharing, little is known about consent in institutional childcare, where formal policies and non-parental figures (e.g., staff and administrators) shape children’s privacy in distinct ways. To investigate this, we analyzed 42 consent forms and conducted 21 semi-structured interviews with parents, educators, and administrators in U.S.-based childcare institutions. Our findings reveal that consent forms serve as procedural, one-time agreements rather than meaningful safeguards. Parents navigate consent pragmatically amidst structural precarity and power asymmetries, while staff performs the unseen labor of consent enforcement. We conclude with implications for reimagining consent and designing usable institutional mechanisms that support children’s privacy and safety in practice.

Technology-facilitated abuse (TFA) is a widespread and harmful dimension of interpersonal violence. Documenting TFA can unlock mitigative actions for survivors such as legal orders of protection, but existing documentation tools are insufficient. This paper considers whether a trauma-informed design approach could yield more effective methods for documenting TFA and how, concretely, to approach trauma-informed digital evidence collection. Toward this goal, we use trauma-informed methods to design a new tool, Sherloc, that helps identify and document TFA within tech clinic interventions. We evaluated Sherloc in feedback sessions with legal experts, then in a small pilot program in the U.S. From our design inquiry, we present novel guidelines for trauma-informed digital evidence collection. We call on HCI researchers to build on our work to envision trauma-informed methods of documenting TFA.

In this short document, we introduce The ACM CCS Young Scholars Development Program (YSDP); a new initiative aiming at supporting early-career researchers within the computer security community. YSDP is created and organized by dedicated chairs. The program promotes collaboration, communication, and professional growth through structured events such as talks, panels, and breakout technical discussions sessions. It emphasizes skill-building and networking, with a focus on integrating young scholars into the broader academic ecosystem. In this report, we detail the planning, selection, and execution of the program, and highlight its role in shaping a stronger research environment.

This paper describes a qualitative study that interrogates the types of technology-facilitated coercive control faced by survivors of human trafcking and uncovers potential interventions to aid survivors' recovery.Via semi-structured interviews with 21 participants, including trafcking survivors and professional advocates, we show how trafckers use technology as a lever for control, engaging in surveillance, blackmail, impersonation, and harassment as they compel survivors to stay in the trafcking situation.In recovery, digital footprints keep survivors tethered to their traffcking experience, impacting their digital autonomy, economic mobility, and feelings of safety.Nevertheless, technology can also be a valuable tool for survivors' recovery, connecting them to essential resources and support systems.We discuss the need for interventions and services that account for the specifcity of the trafcking context to help survivors attain digital safety and autonomy, including the potential to adapt existing tech safety services designed for other contexts to human trafcking. CCS Concepts• Human-centered computing → Empirical studies in HCI ; • Security and privacy → Human and societal aspects of security and privacy.

Abusers routinely use technology to spy on and harass their targets. This harmful behavior is known as technology-facilitated abuse , or tech abuse. Survivors of tech abuse may turn to the legal system for safety and security, and to do so, they need evidence of tech abuse. However, prior work indicates challenges to collecting evidence of tech abuse and using it in legal proceedings. Thus, in this work, we study legal evidence used by survivors of tech abuse in Wisconsin, USA. We report on qualitative interviews and focus groups with 19 legal support providers who work with survivors seeking protective orders, divorces, and criminal charges. Our findings surface current practices that survivors and legal support providers use to prepare and present evidence of tech abuse in Wisconsin and the challenges they face. For example, survivors struggle to collect evidence of covert monitoring and surveillance. When they can collect evidence, it is often difficult to connect that evidence to the abuser due to the anonymous nature of many forms of tech abuse. In court, evidence of tech abuse is frequently challenged and vulnerable to objections and counter-evidence. And at the end of a proceeding, it's not uncommon for a judge to determine that the tech abuse does not meet the statutes. Informed by these results, we encourage CSCW and HCI researchers to work towards designing and deploying sociotechnical solutions that support survivors' use of evidence, in careful collaboration with advocates, legal experts, and survivors.

Since the inception of social media, parents have been sharing information about their children online. Unfortunately, this “sharenting” can expose children to several online and offline risks. Although researchers have studied sharenting on multiple platforms, sharenting on short-form video platforms like TikTok—where posts can contain detailed information, spread quickly, and spark considerable engagement—is understudied. Thus, we provide a targeted exploration of sharenting on TikTok. We analyzed 328 TikTok videos that demonstrate sharenting and 438 videos where TikTok creators discuss sharenting norms. Our results indicate that sharenting on TikTok indeed creates several risks for children, not only within individual posts but also in broader patterns of sharenting that arise when parents repeatedly use children to generate viral content. At the same time, creators voiced sharenting concerns and boundaries that reflect what has been observed on other platforms, indicating the presence of cross-platform norms. Promisingly, we observed that TikTok users are engaging in thoughtful conversations around sharenting and beginning to shift norms toward safer sharenting. We offer concrete suggestions for designers and platforms based on our findings.

Augmented reality (AR) and virtual reality (VR) devices are emerging as prominent contenders to today’s personal computers. As personal devices, users will use AR and VR to store and access their sensitive data and thus will need secure and usable ways to authenticate. In this paper, we evaluate the state-of-the-art of authentication mechanisms for AR/VR devices by systematizing research efforts and practical deployments. By studying users’ experiences with authentication on AR and VR, we gain insight into the important properties needed for authentication on these devices. We then use these properties to perform a comprehensive evaluation of AR/VR authentication mechanisms both proposed in literature and used in practice. In all, we synthesize a coherent picture of the current state of authentication mechanisms for AR/VR devices. We draw on our findings to provide concrete research directions and advice on implementing and evaluating future authentication methods.