Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Inwhan Chun
dblp:326/0576
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
2as first author
3since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Hardware security and side channels · 88% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 12% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
2 papers |
Energy-efficient computing · 54% Processor architecture and microarchitecture · 46% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Compilers and program optimization · 100% |
Topics — the 6 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack
power analysis |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Goldilocks and the Three P-States: Mitigating Hertzbleed with Formal Leakage Guarantees · SP 2026 |
Energy-efficient computing › power management
power state management |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Goldilocks and the Three P-States: Mitigating Hertzbleed with Formal Leakage Guarantees · SP 2026 |
Compilers and program optimization
machine learning compiler |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | SMT-Based Translation Validation for Machine Learning Compiler · CAV (2) 2022 |
Compilers and program optimization › compiler infrastructure
MLIR |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | SMT-Based Translation Validation for Machine Learning Compiler · CAV (2) 2022 |
Compilers and program optimization › verified compilation
translation validation |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | SMT-Based Translation Validation for Machine Learning Compiler · CAV (2) 2022 |
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptographic implementation
constant-time implementation |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Scheduled Disclosure: Turning Power into Timing Without Frequency Scaling · SP 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
formal leakage guarantee · 2.0remote timing analysis · 1.7cross-origin pixel stealing · 1.7abstraction refinement · 0.6SMT solving · 0.6
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Goldilocks and the Three P-States: Mitigating Hertzbleed with Formal Leakage Guarantees
Inwhan Chun, Christine Guo, Riccardo Paccagnella |
SP | 1 |
| 2025 | Scheduled Disclosure: Turning Power into Timing Without Frequency ScalingabstractPower side-channel attacks are seeing a resurgence of interest in computer security research. An emerging class of these attacks exploits remote methods to monitor power consumption-most notably by observing power-dependent CPU frequency variations. However, existing methods have only been demonstrated on (older) x86 CPU architectures where frequency scaling is the primary-if not only-mechanism utilized to keep the system within safe operating conditions. It remains unclear whether remote power side-channel attacks are still feasible on modern x86 CPU architectures with additional, more sophisticated such mechanisms. We demonstrate that not only do remote power-side channel attacks remain feasible on modern x86 CPU architectures, but that they are also more effective and work even in the absence of frequency side-channel leakage. Our attacks take advantage of Thread Director, a hardware optimization that provides scheduling “hints” to enhance performance and energy efficiency on modern Intel processors. We demonstrate that these hints depend on the processor's power consumption, leading to power-dependent scheduling behaviors-such as variations in the number of active cores-that can be observed purely from software and even via remote-timing analysis. We show the efficacy of our attacks by leaking keys from constant-time cryptographic code (5 x faster than prior attacks on older x86 CPUs) and mounting cross-origin pixel stealing attacks. Inwhan Chun, Isabella Siu, Riccardo Paccagnella |
SP | 1 |
| 2022 | SMT-Based Translation Validation for Machine Learning CompilerabstractAbstract Machine learning compilers are large software containing complex transformations for deep learning models, and any buggy transformation may cause a crash or silently bring a regression to the prediction accuracy and performance. This paper proposes an SMT-based translation validation framework for Multi-Level IR (MLIR), a compiler framework used by many deep learning compilers. It proposes an SMT encoding tailored for translation validation that is an over-approximation of the FP arithmetic and reduction operations. It performs abstraction refinement if validation fails. We also propose a new approach for encoding arithmetic properties of reductions in SMT. We found mismatches between the specification and implementation of MLIR, and validated high-level transformations for , , and with proper splitting. Seongwon Bang, Seunghyeon Nam, Inwhan Chun, Ho Young Jhoo, Juneyoung Lee |
CAV (2) | 3 |