Diffusion Large Language Models (dLLMs) have recently emerged as a competitive non-autoregressive paradigm due to their unique training and inference approach. However, there is currently a lack of safety study on this novel architecture. In this paper, we present the first analysis of dLLMs' safety performance and propose a novel safety alignment method tailored to their unique generation characteristics. Specifically, we identify a critical asymmetry between the defender and attacker in terms of security. For the defender, we reveal that the middle tokens of the response, rather than the initial ones, are more critical to the overall safety of dLLM outputs; this seems to suggest that aligning middle tokens can be more beneficial to the defender. The attacker, on the contrary, may have limited power to manipulate middle tokens, as we find dLLMs have a strong tendency towards a sequential generation order in practice, forcing the attack to meet this distribution and diverting it from influencing the critical middle tokens. Building on this asymmetry, we introduce Middle-tOken Safety Alignment (MOSA), a novel method that directly aligns the model's middle generation with safe refusals exploiting reinforcement learning. We implement MOSA and compare its security performance against eight attack methods on two benchmarks. We also test the utility of MOSA-aligned dLLM on coding, math, and general reasoning. The results strongly prove the superiority of MOSA.

Though deep neural models adopted to realize the perception of autonomous driving have proven vulnerable to adversarial examples, known attacks often leverage 2D patches and target mostly monocular perception. Therefore, the effectiveness of Physical Adversarial Examples (PAEs) on stereo-based binocular depth estimation remains largely unexplored. To this end, we propose the first texture-enabled physical adversarial attack against stereo matching models in the context of autonomous driving. Our method employs a 3D PAE with global camouflage texture rather than a local 2D patch-based one, ensuring both visual consistency and attack effectiveness across different viewpoints of stereo cameras. To cope with the disparity effect of these cameras, we also propose a new 3D stereo matching rendering module that allows the PAE to be aligned with real-world positions and headings in binocular vision. We further propose a novel merging attack that seamlessly blends the target into the environment through fine-grained PAE optimization. It has significantly enhanced stealth and lethality upon existing hiding attacks that fail to get seamlessly merged into the background. Extensive evaluations show that our PAEs can successfully fool the stereo models into producing erroneous depth information.

While 3D head reconstruction is widely used for modeling, existing neural reconstruction approaches rely on high-resolution multi-view images, posing notable privacy issues. Individuals are particularly sensitive to facial features, and facial image leakage can lead to many malicious activities, such as unauthorized tracking and deepfake. In contrast, geometric data is less susceptible to misuse due to its complex processing requirements, and absence of facial texture features. In this paper, we propose a novel two-stage 3D facial reconstruction method aimed at avoiding exposure to sensitive facial information while preserving detailed geometric accuracy. Our approach first uses non-sensitive rear-head images for initial geometry and then refines this geometry using processed privacy-removed gradient images. Extensive experiments show that the resulting geometry is comparable to methods using full images, while the process is resistant to DeepFake applications and facial recognition (FR) systems, thereby proving its effectiveness in privacy protection.

Recent advancements in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have demonstrated exceptional performance in multimodal perception and understanding. However, leading open-source MLLMs exhibit significant limitations in complex and structured reasoning, particularly in tasks requiring deep reasoning for decision-making and problem-solving. In this work, we present Corvid, an MLLM with enhanced chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capabilities. Architecturally, Corvid incorporates a hybrid vision encoder for informative visual representation and a meticulously designed connector (GateMixer) to facilitate cross-modal alignment. To enhance Corvid's CoT reasoning capabilities, we introduce MCoT-Instruct-287K, a high-quality multimodal CoT instruction-following dataset, refined and standardized from diverse public reasoning sources. Leveraging this dataset, we fine-tune Corvid with a two-stage CoT-formatted training approach to progressively enhance its step-by-step reasoning abilities. Furthermore, we propose an effective inference-time scaling strategy that enables Corvid to mitigate over-reasoning and under-reasoning through self-verification. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Corvid outperforms existing o1-like MLLMs and state-of-the-art MLLMs with similar parameter scales, with notable strengths in mathematical reasoning and science problem-solving. Project page: https://mm-vl.github.io/corvid.

Despite substantial efforts in safety alignment, recent research indicates that Large Language Models (LLMs) remain highly susceptible to jailbreak attacks. Among these attacks, finetuning-based ones that compromise LLMs’ safety alignment via fine-tuning stand out due to its stable jailbreak performance. In particular, a recent study indicates that fine-tuning with as few as 10 harmful question-answer (QA) pairs can lead to successful jailbreaking across various harmful questions. However, such malicious fine-tuning attacks are readily detectable and hence thwarted by moderation models. In this paper, we demonstrate that LLMs can be jailbroken by fine-tuning with only 10 benign QA pairs; our attack exploits the increased sensitivity of LLMs to fine-tuning data after being overfitted. Specifically, our fine-tuning process starts with overfitting an LLM via fine-tuning with benign QA pairs involving identical refusal answers. Further fine-tuning is then performed with standard benign answers, causing the overfitted LLM to forget the refusal attitude and thus provide compliant answers regardless of the harmfulness of a question. We implement our attack on the ten LLMs and compare it with five existing baselines. Experiments demonstrate that our method achieves significant advantages in both attack effectiveness and attack stealth. Our findings expose previously unreported security vulnerabilities in current LLMs and provide a new perspective on understanding how LLMs’ security is compromised, even with benign fine-tuning. Our code is available at https://github.com/ZHIXINXIE/ten_benign.git.