EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Erica Chiang
dblp:326/4421
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Network security · 100% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Software-defined and programmable networks · 77% Internet architecture and protocols · 23% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Software-defined and programmable networks
network function |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | SurgeProtector: mitigating temporal algorithmic complexity attacks using adversarial scheduling · SIGCOMM 2022 |
Network security › attack strategy › denial-of-service attack
algorithmic complexity attacks |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | SurgeProtector: mitigating temporal algorithmic complexity attacks using adversarial scheduling · SIGCOMM 2022 |
Network security › attack strategy
denial-of-service attack |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | SurgeProtector: mitigating temporal algorithmic complexity attacks using adversarial scheduling · SIGCOMM 2022 |
Internet architecture and protocols
packet processing |
0.2 | 1 | 2022 | SurgeProtector: mitigating temporal algorithmic complexity attacks using adversarial scheduling · SIGCOMM 2022 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
adversarial scheduling · 1.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | SurgeProtector: mitigating temporal algorithmic complexity attacks using adversarial schedulingabstractDenial-of-Service (DoS) attacks are the bane of public-facing network deployments. Algorithmic complexity attacks (ACAs) are a class of DoS attacks where an attacker uses a small amount of adversarial traffic to induce a large amount of work in the target system, pushing the system into overload and causing it to drop packets from innocent users. ACAs are particularly dangerous because, unlike volumetric DoS attacks, ACAs don't require a significant network bandwidth investment from the attacker Today, network functions (NFs) on the Internet must be designed and engineered on a case-by-case basis to mitigate the debilitating impact of ACAs. Further, the resulting designs tend to be overly conservative in their attack mitigation strategy, limiting the innocent traffic that the NF can serve under common-case operation. Nirav Atre, Hugo Sadok, Erica Chiang, Weina Wang 0001, Justine Sherry |
SIGCOMM | 3 |