EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Christian Bungartz
dblp:326/7549
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
0as first author
4since 2021 · last 2024
0009-0008-0576-8744ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 3 · 3 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Assessing the Impact of Large Language Models on Cybersecurity Education: A Study of ChatGPT's Influence on Student PerformanceabstractThe popularity of chatbots to facilitate day-to-day business, including students and their study exercises, is on the rise. This paper investigates the extent and effects on the academic performance of students that leverage such tools. While many other approaches are hypothesized and discussed, we measure empirically. We recorded and compared the performance of cybersecurity students in weekly exercises and final exams over a period of three years. This allows us to have three groups with varying degrees of ChatGPT influence, namely no access, uncontrolled access, and controlled access. In an anonymous survey, we found that approximately 80% of our students utilize ChatGPT during the weekly assignments in 2023. However, none of them indicated this on their submission, despite it being a mandatory requirement. Through statistical analysis of achieved points in our sample groups, we identified that students perform similarly on the weekly assignments. However, their performance on the final examination deteriorates. Marc Ohm, Christian Bungartz, Felix Boes, Michael Meier 0001 |
ARES | 2 |
| 2024 | SoK: Automated Software Testing for TLS LibrariesabstractReusable software components, typically integrated as libraries, are a central paradigm of modern software development. By incorporating a library into their software, developers trust in its quality and its correct and complete implementation. Since errors in a library affect all applications using it, there is a need for quality assurance tools such as automated testing that can be used by library and application developers to verify the functionality. In the past decade, many different systems have been published that focus on the automated analysis of TLS implementations for finding bugs and security vulnerabilities. However, all of these systems focus only on few TLS components and lack a common analysis scenario and inter-approach comparisons. Especially, the amount of manual effort required across the whole analysis process to obtain the root cause of an error is often ignored. In this paper, we survey and categorize literature on automated testing approaches for TLS libraries. The results reveal a heterogeneous landscape of approaches with a trade-off between the manual effort required for setup and for result interpretation, along with major deficits in the considered performance metrics. These imply important future directions to advance the current state of protocol test automation. Ben Swierzy, Felix Boes, Timo Pohl, Christian Bungartz, Michael Meier 0001 |
ARES | 4 |
| 2024 | Analyzing the Potency of Pretrained Transformer Models for Automated Program RepairabstractManually finding and fixing bugs is cumbersome work, which consumes valuable resources in the software development cycle. In this work, we examine the capability of pretrained transformer models to tackle the task of automated program repair. Previous research has been focused on inherently different machine learning architectures for solving this use case. Our contributions include a novel dataset for fine-tuning the models, the introduction of a windowing technique augmenting the pretrained model and the evaluation on the commonly used Defects4J benchmark along with an ablation study. The findings demonstrate that leveraging our dataset leads to enhanced model performance surpassing Bugs2Fix. Our model enhancements significantly boost overall performance, enabling resulting models to achieve parity with the current state of the art by fixing 30 bugs in 27 minutes on Defects4J. This shows that pretrained transformers are promising for the task of automated bug fixing and should be considered by future research. However, similar to the existing state-of-the-art solutions, the performance still needs be improved to provide practical benefits to end users. Maximilian Leiwig, Ben Swierzy, Christian Bungartz, Michael Meier 0001 |
SEAA | 3 |
| 2022 | On the Feasibility of Supervised Machine Learning for the Detection of Malicious Software PackagesabstractModern software development heavily relies on a multitude of externally – often also open source – developed components that constitute a so-called Software Supply Chain. Over the last few years a rise of trojanized (i.e., maliciously manipulated) software packages have been observed and addressed in multiple academic publications. A central issue of this is the timely detection of such malicious packages for which typically single heuristic- or machine learning based approaches have been chosen. Especially the general suitability of supervised machine learning is currently not fully covered. In order to gain insight, we analyze a diverse set of commonly employed supervised machine learning techniques, both quantitatively and qualitatively. More precisely, we leverage a labeled dataset of known malicious software packages on which we measure the performance of each technique. This is followed by an in-depth analysis of the three best performing classifiers on unlabeled data, i.e., the whole npm package repository. Our combination of multiple classifiers indicates a good viability of supervised machine learning for the detection of malicious packages by pre-selecting a feasible number of suspicious packages for further manual analysis. This research effort includes the evaluation of over 25,210 different models which led to True Positive Rates of over 70 % and the detection and reporting of 13 previously unknown malicious packages. Marc Ohm, Felix Boes, Christian Bungartz, Michael Meier 0001 |
ARES | 3 |