Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

David Dalva

dblp:328/5009 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 1989
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Operating systems · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Operating systems › system security › operating system security
access control
0.011989
Access Mediation in a Message Passing Kernel · S&P 1989
Operating systems › system security › operating system security › access control
mandatory access control
0.011989
Access Mediation in a Message Passing Kernel · S&P 1989
Operating systems › kernel
kernel design
0.011989
Access Mediation in a Message Passing Kernel · S&P 1989
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1989 Access Mediation in a Message Passing Kernel
abstract
The authors describe how mandatory and discretionary access mediation are performed in the trusted mach (TMach) kernel, a system that uses message passing as its primary means of communication both between tasks and with the kernel. As a consequence, control of interprocess communication in the TMach kernel is a central concern whereas controlled sharing of segments is the central focus in trusted systems with more traditional architectures. The TMach kernel is not a complete trusted system. It is a reference monitor of basic system abstractions, providing a small, well-controlled base on which the rest of a trusted computing base and operating system can be constructed. The TMach kernel provides simple and elegant mandatory access control for port access rights. The TMach kernel's MAC (mandatory access control) mechanisms clearly control the flow of information according to a mandatory security policy based on a Bell and La Padula model. DAC (discretionary access control) mechanisms are provided in the TMach kernel to implement TCSEC (trusted computer system evaluation criteria) requirements and to support DAC in servers to be built on the kernel.>
Martha A. Branstad, Homayoon Tajalli, Frank Mayer, David Dalva
S&P4