Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
David Dalva
dblp:328/5009
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 1989
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Operating systems · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Operating systems › system security › operating system security
access control |
0.0 | 1 | 1989 | Access Mediation in a Message Passing Kernel · S&P 1989 |
Operating systems › system security › operating system security › access control
mandatory access control |
0.0 | 1 | 1989 | Access Mediation in a Message Passing Kernel · S&P 1989 |
Operating systems › kernel
kernel design |
0.0 | 1 | 1989 | Access Mediation in a Message Passing Kernel · S&P 1989 |
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1989 | Access Mediation in a Message Passing KernelabstractThe authors describe how mandatory and discretionary access mediation are performed in the trusted mach (TMach) kernel, a system that uses message passing as its primary means of communication both between tasks and with the kernel. As a consequence, control of interprocess communication in the TMach kernel is a central concern whereas controlled sharing of segments is the central focus in trusted systems with more traditional architectures. The TMach kernel is not a complete trusted system. It is a reference monitor of basic system abstractions, providing a small, well-controlled base on which the rest of a trusted computing base and operating system can be constructed. The TMach kernel provides simple and elegant mandatory access control for port access rights. The TMach kernel's MAC (mandatory access control) mechanisms clearly control the flow of information according to a mandatory security policy based on a Bell and La Padula model. DAC (discretionary access control) mechanisms are provided in the TMach kernel to implement TCSEC (trusted computer system evaluation criteria) requirements and to support DAC in servers to be built on the kernel.> Martha A. Branstad, Homayoon Tajalli, Frank Mayer, David Dalva |
S&P | 4 |