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Louis Tremblay Thibault

dblp:328/9479 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-5804-3703ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 81% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 19%

Topics — the 9 heaviest of 9, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
oblivious pseudorandom function
0.912025
Pool: A Practical OT-based OPRF from Learning with Rounding · CCS 2025
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › oblivious pseudorandom function
post-quantum OPRF
0.912025
Pool: A Practical OT-based OPRF from Learning with Rounding · CCS 2025
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems › zero-knowledge proofs
succinct arguments
0.912025
Towards Verifiable FHE in Practice: Proving Correct Execution of TFHE's Bootstrapping using plonky2 · CCS 2025
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
verifiable computation
0.912025
Towards Verifiable FHE in Practice: Proving Correct Execution of TFHE's Bootstrapping using plonky2 · CCS 2025
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems › zero-knowledge proofs › non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
zk-SNARK
0.912025
Towards Verifiable FHE in Practice: Proving Correct Execution of TFHE's Bootstrapping using plonky2 · CCS 2025
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › homomorphic encryption
fully homomorphic encryption
0.312025
Towards Verifiable FHE in Practice: Proving Correct Execution of TFHE's Bootstrapping using plonky2 · CCS 2025
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptographic assumptions
learning with rounding
0.312025
Pool: A Practical OT-based OPRF from Learning with Rounding · CCS 2025
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
post-quantum cryptography
0.312025
Pool: A Practical OT-based OPRF from Learning with Rounding · CCS 2025
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › homomorphic encryption › fully homomorphic encryption
TFHE bootstrapping
0.312025
Towards Verifiable FHE in Practice: Proving Correct Execution of TFHE's Bootstrapping using plonky2 · CCS 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

recursion · 0.9random oracle · 0.9learning with rounding · 0.9incrementally verifiable computation · 0.9arithmetic circuit design · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Pool: A Practical OT-based OPRF from Learning with Rounding
abstract
We propose Pool: a conceptually simple post-quantum (PQ) oblivious pseudorandom function (OPRF) protocol, that is round-optimal (with input-independent preprocessing), practically efficient, and has security based on the well-understood hardness of the learning with rounding (LWR) problem. Specifically, our design permits oblivious computation of the LWR-based pseudorandom function Fsk(x) = ⌉ H(x)⊤ ⋅ sk ⌋q,p, for random oracle H: {0,1} * → ℤ qn and uniformly chosen sk∈ {0,1} n. For 128-bits of semi-honest security, the Pool OPRF has an online communication cost of 11.9 kB, and a computational runtime of less than 3 ms on a single thread (via an open-source software implementation). This is more efficient (in either online communication cost or runtime) than constructions from well-known PQ PRFs, and is competitive even with constructions that only conjecture PQ security on lesser-known assumptions. As a result, our design gives high-performance, post-quantum variants of established OPRF applications in multi-party computation and private set operation protocols.
Alex Davidson, Amit Deo, Louis Tremblay Thibault
CCS3
2025 Towards Verifiable FHE in Practice: Proving Correct Execution of TFHE's Bootstrapping using plonky2
abstract
In this work we demonstrate for the first time that a full FHE bootstrapping operation can be proven using a SNARK in practice. We do so by designing an arithmetic circuit for the bootstrapping operation and prove it using plonky2. We are able to prove the circuit on an AWS Hpc7a instance in under 20 minutes. Proof size is about 200 kB and verification takes less than 10 ms. As the basis of our bootstrapping operation we use TFHE's programmable bootstrapping and modify it in a few places to more efficiently represent it as an arithmetic circuit (while maintaining full functionality and security). In order to achieve our results in a memory-efficient way, we take advantage of the structure of the computation and plonky2's ability to efficiently prove its own verification circuit to implement a recursion-based IVC scheme. Lastly, we present a security proof in the UC model that captures active attacks in real world applications of verifiable FHE and augment our prototype to fit such applications.
Louis Tremblay Thibault, Michael Walter 0001
CCS1