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Alex Luoyuan Xiong

dblp:329/5827 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 57% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 43%
Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Coding theory · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptographic foundations › cryptographic commitments
polynomial commitment
1.012026
UltraProofs: Scalable Reed-Solomon Code Commitment · SP 2026
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure distributed computation
0.712023
VeriZexe: Decentralized Private Computation with Universal Setup · USENIX Security Symposium 2023
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems
zero-knowledge proofs
0.712023
VeriZexe: Decentralized Private Computation with Universal Setup · USENIX Security Symposium 2023
Coding theory › error-correcting codes
reed-solomon codes
0.312026
UltraProofs: Scalable Reed-Solomon Code Commitment · SP 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

universal setup · 0.7decentralized private computation · 0.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 UltraProofs: Scalable Reed-Solomon Code Commitment
Yanpei Guo, Alex Luoyuan Xiong, Wenjie Qu 0001, Jiaheng Zhang
SP2
2023 VeriZexe: Decentralized Private Computation with Universal Setup
Alex Luoyuan Xiong, Binyi Chen, Zhenfei Zhang, Benedikt Bünz, Ben Fisch, Fernando Krell, Philippe Camacho
USENIX Security Symposium1