Adaptive sequential behavior is a hallmark of human cognition. In particular, humans can learn to produce precise spatiotemporal sequences given a certain context. For instance, musicians can not only reproduce learned action sequences in a context-dependent manner, they can also quickly and flexibly reapply them in any desired tempo or rhythm without overwriting previous learning. Existing neural network models fail to account for these properties. We argue that this limitation emerges from the fact that sequence information (i.e., the position of the action) and timing (i.e., the moment of response execution) are typically stored in the same neural network weights. Here, we augment a biologically plausible recurrent neural network of cortical dynamics to include a basal ganglia-thalamic module which uses reinforcement learning to dynamically modulate action. This "associative cluster-dependent chain" (ACDC) model modularly stores sequence and timing information in distinct loci of the network. This feature increases computational power and allows ACDC to display a wide range of temporal properties (e.g., multiple sequences, temporal shifting, rescaling, and compositionality), while still accounting for several behavioral and neurophysiological empirical observations. Finally, we apply this ACDC network to show how it can learn the famous "Thunderstruck" song intro and then flexibly play it in a "bossa nova" rhythm without further training.

Adaptive behavior requires balancing approach and avoidance based on the rewarding and aversive consequences of actions. Imbalances in this evaluation are thought to characterize mood disorders such as major depressive disorder (MDD). We present a novel application of the drift diffusion model (DDM) suited to quantify how offers of reward and aversiveness, and neural correlates thereof, are dynamically integrated to form decisions, and how such processes are altered in MDD. Hierarchical parameter estimation from the DDM demonstrated that the MDD group differed in three distinct reward-related parameters driving approach-based decision making. First, MDD was associated with reduced reward sensitivity, measured as the impact of offered reward on evidence accumulation. Notably, this effect was replicated in a follow-up study. Second, the MDD group showed lower starting point bias towards approaching offers. Third, this starting point was influenced in opposite directions by Pavlovian effects and by nucleus accumbens activity across the groups: greater accumbens activity was related to approach bias in controls but avoid bias in MDD. Cross-validation revealed that the combination of these computational biomarkers were diagnostic of patient status, with accumbens influences being particularly diagnostic. Finally, within the MDD group, reward sensitivity and nucleus accumbens parameters were differentially related to symptoms of perceived stress and depression. Collectively, these findings establish the promise of computational psychiatry approaches to dissecting approach-avoidance decision dynamics relevant for affective disorders.

Adaptive cognitive-control involves a hierarchical cortico-striatal gating system that supports selective updating, maintenance, and retrieval of useful cognitive and motor information. Here, we developed a task that independently manipulates selective gating operations into working-memory (input gating), from working-memory (output gating), and of responses (motor gating) and tested the neural dynamics and computational principles that support them. Increases in gating demands, captured by gate switches, were expressed by distinct EEG correlates at each gating level that evolved dynamically in partially overlapping time windows. Further, categorical representations of specific maintained items and of motor responses could be decoded from EEG when the corresponding gate was switching, thereby linking gating operations to prioritization. Finally, gate switching at all levels was related to increases in the motor decision threshold as quantified by the drift diffusion model. Together these results support the notion that cognitive gating operations scaffold on top of mechanisms involved in motor gating.

Humans routinely face novel environments in which they have to generalize in order to act adaptively. However, doing so involves the non-trivial challenge of deciding which aspects of a task domain to generalize. While it is sometimes appropriate to simply re-use a learned behavior, often adaptive generalization entails recombining distinct components of knowledge acquired across multiple contexts. Theoretical work has suggested a computational trade-off in which it can be more or less useful to learn and generalize aspects of task structure jointly or compositionally, depending on previous task statistics, but it is unknown whether humans modulate their generalization strategy accordingly. Here we develop a series of navigation tasks that separately manipulate the statistics of goal values ("what to do") and state transitions ("how to do it") across contexts and assess whether human subjects generalize these task components separately or conjunctively. We find that human generalization is sensitive to the statistics of the previously experienced task domain, favoring compositional or conjunctive generalization when the task statistics are indicative of such structures, and a mixture of the two when they are more ambiguous. These results support a normative "meta-generalization" account and suggests that people not only generalize previous task components but also generalize the statistical structure most likely to support generalization.

In computer science, reinforcement learning is a powerful framework with which artificial agents can learn to maximize their performance for any given Markov decision process (MDP). Advances over the last decade, in combination with deep neural networks, have enjoyed performance advantages over humans in many difficult task settings. However, such frameworks perform far less favorably when evaluated in their ability to generalize or transfer representations across different tasks. Existing algorithms that facilitate transfer typically are limited to cases in which the transition function or the optimal policy is portable to new contexts, but achieving "deep transfer" characteristic of human behavior has been elusive. Such transfer typically requires discovery of abstractions that permit analogical reuse of previously learned representations to superficially distinct tasks. Here, we demonstrate that abstractions that minimize error in predictions of reward outcomes generalize across tasks with different transition and reward functions. Such reward-predictive representations compress the state space of a task into a lower dimensional representation by combining states that are equivalent in terms of both the transition and reward functions. Because only state equivalences are considered, the resulting state representation is not tied to the transition and reward functions themselves and thus generalizes across tasks with different reward and transition functions. These results contrast with those using abstractions that myopically maximize reward in any given MDP and motivate further experiments in humans and animals to investigate if neural and cognitive systems involved in state representation perform abstractions that facilitate such equivalence relations.

Computational modeling plays an important role in modern neuroscience research. Much previous research has relied on statistical methods, separately, to address two problems that are actually interdependent. First, given a particular computational model, Bayesian hierarchical techniques have been used to estimate individual variation in parameters over a population of subjects, leveraging their population-level distributions. Second, candidate models are themselves compared, and individual variation in the expressed model estimated, according to the fits of the models to each subject. The interdependence between these two problems arises because the relevant population for estimating parameters of a model depends on which other subjects express the model. Here, we propose a hierarchical Bayesian inference (HBI) framework for concurrent model comparison, parameter estimation and inference at the population level, combining previous approaches. We show that this framework has important advantages for both parameter estimation and model comparison theoretically and experimentally. The parameters estimated by the HBI show smaller errors compared to other methods. Model comparison by HBI is robust against outliers and is not biased towards overly simplistic models. Furthermore, the fully Bayesian approach of our theory enables researchers to make inference on group-level parameters by performing HBI t-test.

Humans are remarkably adept at generalizing knowledge between experiences in a way that can be difficult for computers. Often, this entails generalizing constituent pieces of experiences that do not fully overlap, but nonetheless share useful similarities with, previously acquired knowledge. However, it is often unclear how knowledge gained in one context should generalize to another. Previous computational models and data suggest that rather than learning about each individual context, humans build latent abstract structures and learn to link these structures to arbitrary contexts, facilitating generalization. In these models, task structures that are more popular across contexts are more likely to be revisited in new contexts. However, these models can only re-use policies as a whole and are unable to transfer knowledge about the transition structure of the environment even if only the goal has changed (or vice-versa). This contrasts with ecological settings, where some aspects of task structure, such as the transition function, will be shared between context separately from other aspects, such as the reward function. Here, we develop a novel non-parametric Bayesian agent that forms independent latent clusters for transition and reward functions, affording separable transfer of their constituent parts across contexts. We show that the relative performance of this agent compared to an agent that jointly clusters reward and transition functions depends environmental task statistics: the mutual information between transition and reward functions and the stochasticity of the observations. We formalize our analysis through an information theoretic account of the priors, and propose a meta learning agent that dynamically arbitrates between strategies across task domains to optimize a statistical tradeoff.

Study of human executive function focuses on our ability to represent cognitive rules independently of stimulus or response modality. However, recent findings suggest that executive functions cannot be modularized separately from perceptual and motor systems, and that they instead scaffold on top of motor action selection. Here we investigate whether patterns of motor demands influence how participants choose to implement abstract rule structures. In a learning task that requires integrating two stimulus dimensions for determining appropriate responses, subjects typically structure the problem hierarchically, using one dimension to cue the task-set and the other to cue the response given the task-set. However, the choice of which dimension to use at each level can be arbitrary. We hypothesized that the specific structure subjects adopt would be constrained by the motor patterns afforded within each rule. Across four independent data-sets, we show that subjects create rule structures that afford motor clustering, preferring structures in which adjacent motor actions are valid within each task-set. In a fifth data-set using instructed rules, this bias was strong enough to counteract the well-known task switch-cost when instructions were incongruent with motor clustering. Computational simulations confirm that observed biases can be explained by leveraging overlap in cortical motor representations to improve outcome prediction and hence infer the structure to be learned. These results highlight the importance of sensorimotor constraints in abstract rule formation and shed light on why humans have strong biases to invent structure even when it does not exist.

In this letter, we examine the computational mechanisms of reinforce-ment-based decision making. We bridge the gap across multiple levels of analysis, from neural models of corticostriatal circuits-the basal ganglia (BG) model (Frank, 2005 , 2006 ) to simpler but mathematically tractable diffusion models of two-choice decision making. Specifically, we generated simulated data from the BG model and fit the diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978 ) to it. The standard diffusion model fits underestimated response times under conditions of high response and reinforcement conflict. Follow-up fits showed good fits to the data both by increasing nondecision time and by raising decision thresholds as a function of conflict and by allowing this threshold to collapse with time. This profile captures the role and dynamics of the subthalamic nucleus in BG circuitry, and as such, parametric modulations of projection strengths from this nucleus were associated with parametric increases in decision boundary and its modulation by conflict. We then present data from a human reinforcement learning experiment involving decisions with low- and high-reinforcement conflict. Again, the standard model failed to fit the data, but we found that two variants similar to those that fit the BG model data fit the experimental data, thereby providing a convergence of theoretical accounts of complex interactive decision-making mechanisms consistent with available data. This work also demonstrates how to make modest modifications to diffusion models to summarize core computations of the BG model. The result is a better fit and understanding of reinforcement-based choice data than that which would have occurred with either model alone.

The prefrontal cortex has long been thought to subserve both working memory (the holding of information online for processing) and executive functions (deciding how to manipulate working memory and perform processing). Although many computational models of working memory have been developed, the mechanistic basis of executive function remains elusive, often amounting to a homunculus. This article presents an attempt to deconstruct this homunculus through powerful learning mechanisms that allow a computational model of the prefrontal cortex to control both itself and other brain areas in a strategic, task-appropriate manner. These learning mechanisms are based on subcortical structures in the midbrain, basal ganglia, and amygdala, which together form an actor-critic architecture. The critic system learns which prefrontal representations are task relevant and trains the actor, which in turn provides a dynamic gating mechanism for controlling working memory updating. Computationally, the learning mechanism is designed to simultaneously solve the temporal and structural credit assignment problems. The model's performance compares favorably with standard backpropagation-based temporal learning mechanisms on the challenging 1-2-AX working memory task and other benchmark working memory tasks.