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Yue Wang 0086

dblp:33/4822-86 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0006-2710-8945ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › auction theory › advertising auctions
ad auction design
0.912025
Two-stage Auction Design in Online Advertising · WWW 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
mechanism design
0.912025
Two-stage Auction Design in Online Advertising · WWW 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
revenue maximization
0.912025
Two-stage Auction Design in Online Advertising · WWW 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
two-stage auction
0.912025
Two-stage Auction Design in Online Advertising · WWW 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
welfare maximization
0.312025
Two-stage Auction Design in Online Advertising · WWW 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

two-stage auction · 0.9coarse-to-fine model · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Two-stage Auction Design in Online Advertising
abstract
Modern online advertising systems often involve a substantial number of advertisers in each auction, which results in scalability issues. To address this challenge, two-stage auctions have been designed and implemented in practice. These auctions enable efficient allocation of ad slots among numerous candidate advertisers in a short response time. This approach employs a fast yet coarse model in the first stage to select a small subset of advertisers, followed by a slow, more refined model to determine the final winners. However, existing two-stage auction mechanisms primarily focus on optimizing welfare, overlooking other critical objectives of the platform, such as revenue.
Zhikang Fan 0001, Lan Hu, Ruirui Wang, Zhongrui Ma, Yue Wang 0086, Qi Ye 0006, Weiran Shen
WWW5