The growing complexity of global supply chains has made hardware Trojans a significant threat in sensor-based power electronics. Traditional Trojan designs depend on digital triggers or fixed threshold conditions that can be detected during standard testing. In contrast, we introduce Environ-mental Rate Manipulation (ERM), a novel Trojan triggering mechanism that activates by monitoring the rate of change in environmental parameters rather than their absolute values. This approach allows the Trojan to remain inactive under normal conditions and evade redundancy and sensor-fusion defenses. We implement a compact 14 µm2circuit that mea-sures capacitor charging rates in standard sensor front-ends and disrupts inverter pulse-width modulation PWM signals when a rapid change is induced. Experiments on a commercial Texas Instruments solar inverter demonstrate that ERM can trigger catastrophic driver chip failure. Furthermore, ETAP simulations indicate that a single compromised 100 kW in-verter may initiate cascading grid instabilities. The attack's significance extends beyond individual sensors to entire classes of environmental sensing systems common in power electronics, demonstrating fundamental challenges for hardware security.

Function name prediction is crucial for understanding stripped binaries in software reverse engineering, a key step for enabling subsequent vulnerability analysis and patching. However, existing approaches often struggle with architecture-specific limitations, data scarcity, and diverse naming conventions. We present AGNOMIN, a novel architecture-agnostic approach for multi-label function name prediction in stripped binaries. AGNOMIN builds Feature-Enriched Hierarchical Graphs (FEHGs), combining Control Flow Graphs, Function Call Graphs, and dynamically learned PCode features. A hierarchical graph neural network processes this enriched structure to generate consistent function representations across architectures, vital for scalable security assessments. For function name prediction, AGNOMIN employs a Renée-inspired decoder, enhanced with an attention-based head layer and algorithmic improvements. We evaluate AGNOMIN on a comprehensive dataset of 9,000 ELF executable binaries across three architectures, demonstrating its superior performance compared to state-of-the-art approaches, with improvements of up to 27.17% in precision and 55.86% in recall across the testing dataset. Moreover, AGNOMIN generalizes well to unseen architectures, achieving 5.89% higher recall than the closest baseline. AGNOMIN's practical utility has been validated through security hackathons, where it successfully aided reverse engineers in analyzing and patching vulnerable binaries across different architectures.

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) rely heavily on ProgrammableLogic Controllers (PLCs) to manage critical infrastructure, yet analyzing PLC executables remains challenging due to diverse proprietary compilers and limited access to source code.To bridge this gap, we introduce PLC-BEAD, a comprehensive dataset containing 2431 compiled binaries from 700+ PLC programs across four major industrial compilers (CoDeSys, GEB, OpenPLC-V2, OpenPLC-V3).This novel dataset uniquely pairs each binary with its original Structured Text source code and standardized functionality labels, enabling both binary-level and source-level analysis.We demonstrate the dataset's utility through PLCEmbed, a transformer-based framework for binary code analysis that achieves 93% accuracy in compiler provenance identification and 42% accuracy in finegrained functionality classification across 22 industrial control categories.Through comprehensive ablation studies, we analyze how compiler optimization levels, code patterns, and class distributions influence model performance.We provide detailed documentation of the dataset creation process, labeling taxonomy, and benchmark protocols to ensure reproducibility.Both PLC-BEAD and PLCEmbed are released as open-source resources to foster research in PLC security, reverse engineering, and ICS forensics, establishing new baselines for data-driven approaches to industrial cybersecurity.

Differential Pressure Sensors are widely deployed to monitor critical environments. However, our research unveils a previously overlooked vulnerability: their high sensitivity to pressure variations makes them susceptible to acoustic side-channel attacks. We demonstrate that the pressure-sensing diaphragms in DPS can inadvertently capture subtle air vibrations caused by speech, which propagate through the sensor’s components and affect the pressure readings. Exploiting this discovery, we introduce BaroVox, a novel attack that reconstructs speech from DPS readings, effectively turning DPS into "a fly on the wall." We model the effect of sound on DPS, exploring the limits and challenges of acoustic leakage. To overcome these challenges, we propose two solutions: a signal-processing approach using a unique spectral subtraction method and a deep learning-based approach for keyword classification. Evaluations under various conditions demonstrate BaroVox’s effectiveness, achieving a word error rate of 0.29 for manual recognition and 90.51% accuracy for automatic recognition. Our findings highlight the significant privacy implications of this vulnerability. We also discuss potential defense strategies to mitigate the risks posed by BaroVox.

Network-based security has emerged as an increasingly critical challenge in the domain of the Internet of Things (IoT). A number of network intrusion detection systems (NIDS), typically relying on sophisticated machine learning (ML) algorithms, have been proposed to monitor network traffic and detect malicious activity. However, these NIDS designs require extensive memory and computational power, exceeding the capability of today’s IoT devices, and often fail to provide timely detection of network attacks. To tackle this issue, we propose HyperDetect, the first attempt at NIDS modeling that leverages the highly efficient and parallel operations of brain-inspired hyperdimensional computing (HDC). Our innovative model updating method effectively mitigates model saturation and significantly reduces the number of retraining iterations needed to reach convergence. Additionally, we employ a novel dynamic encoding technique to regenerate insignificant dimensions, considerably lowering the dimensionalities required to achieve high-quality performance and further accelerating the learning process. HyperDetect delivers on average 5.02× faster training and 31.83× faster inference compared to state-of-the-art (SOTA) learning approaches on a wide range of network intrusion classification tasks. We also extensively evaluate HyperDetect on embedded hardware to demonstrate its low-latency and resource-efficient characteristics.

A Negative Pressure Room (NPR) is an essential requirement by the Bio-Safety Levels (BSLs) in biolabs or infectious-control hospitals to prevent deadly pathogens from being leaked from the facility. An NPR maintains a negative pressure inside with respect to the outside reference space so that microbes are contained inside of an NPR. Nowadays, differential pressure sensors (DPSs) are utilized by the Building Management Systems (BMSs) to control and monitor the negative pressure in an NPR. This paper demonstrates a non-invasive and stealthy attack on NPRs by spoofing a DPS at its resonant frequency. Our contributions are: (1) We show that DPSs used in NPRs typically have resonant frequencies in the audible range. (2) We use this finding to design malicious music to create resonance in DPSs, resulting in an overshooting in the DPS's normal pressure readings. (3) We show how the resonance in DPSs can fool the BMSs so that the NPR turns its negative pressure to a positive one, causing a potential leak of deadly microbes from NPRs. We do experiments on 8 DPSs from 5 different manufacturers to evaluate their resonant frequencies considering the sampling tube length and find resonance in 6 DPSs. We can achieve a 2.5 Pa change in negative pressure from a ~7 cm distance when a sampling tube is not present and from a ~2.5 cm distance for a 1 m sampling tube length. We also introduce an interval-time variation approach for an adversarial control over the negative pressure and show that the forged pressure can be varied within 12 - 33 Pa. Our attack is also capable of attacking multiple NPRs simultaneously. Moreover, we demonstrate our attack at a real-world NPR located in an anonymous bioresearch facility, which is FDA approved and follows CDC guidelines. We also provide countermeasures to prevent the attack.