Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data.

Soufian El Yadmani

dblp:331/3330 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 67% Privacy and data protection · 33%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
cloud security
0.912025
The File That Contained the Keys Has Been Removed: An Empirical Analysis of Secret Leaks in Cloud Buckets and Responsible Disclosure Outcomes · SP 2025
Privacy and data protection › information leakage
credential disclosure
0.912025
The File That Contained the Keys Has Been Removed: An Empirical Analysis of Secret Leaks in Cloud Buckets and Responsible Disclosure Outcomes · SP 2025
Systems and software security
secret leakage
0.912025
The File That Contained the Keys Has Been Removed: An Empirical Analysis of Secret Leaks in Cloud Buckets and Responsible Disclosure Outcomes · SP 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

large-scale scanning · 0.9empirical analysis · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 The File That Contained the Keys Has Been Removed: An Empirical Analysis of Secret Leaks in Cloud Buckets and Responsible Disclosure Outcomes
abstract
With the growing reliance on cloud services for storage and deployment, securing cloud environments has become critically important. Cloud storage solutions like AWS S3, Google Cloud Storage, and Azure Blob Storage are widely used to store vast amounts of data, including sensitive configuration files used in software development. These files often contain secrets such as API keys and credentials. Misconfigured cloud buckets can inadvertently expose these secrets, leading to unauthorized access to services and security breaches. In this work, we explore the issue of secret leaks in files exposed through misconfigured cloud storage. Our analysis covers a variety of file formats frequently used in development and focuses on different secrets that have diverse types of impact as well as the possibility for a non-intrusive validation. By systematically scanning a large collection of publicly acces-sible cloud buckets, we identified 215 instances where sensitive credentials were exposed. These secrets provide unauthorized access to services like databases, cloud infrastructure, and third-party APIs, posing significant security risks. Upon discovering these leaks, we responsibly reported them to the respective organizations and cloud service providers and measured the outcomes of the disclosure process. Our respon-sible disclosure efforts led to the remediation of 95 issues. Twenty organizations directly communicated their actions back to us, promptly addressing the issues, while the remaining fixes were implemented without direct feedback to the disclosers. Our study highlights the global prevalence of secret leaks in cloud storage and emphasizes the varied responses from organizations in mitigating these critical security risks.
Soufian El Yadmani, Olga Gadyatskaya, Yury Zhauniarovich
SP1