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Rebekah Sowards

dblp:331/5915 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Network security · 87% Systems and software security · 13%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security
email security
0.612022
SPFail: discovering, measuring, and remediating vulnerabilities in email sender validation · IMC 2022
Network security › protocol security
source authentication
0.612022
SPFail: discovering, measuring, and remediating vulnerabilities in email sender validation · IMC 2022
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery
0.212022
SPFail: discovering, measuring, and remediating vulnerabilities in email sender validation · IMC 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

remote detection technique · 0.6continuous measurement · 0.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 SPFail: discovering, measuring, and remediating vulnerabilities in email sender validation
abstract
Email is an important medium for Internet communication. Secure email infrastructure is therefore of utmost importance. In this paper we discuss two software vulnerabilities discovered in libSPF2, a library used by mail servers across the Internet for email sender validation with the Sender Policy Framework (SPF). We describe a technique to remotely detect the vulnerabilities in a production mail server, and we use that technique to quantify the vulnerability of Internet mail servers. We also monitor the patch rate of affected servers by performing continuous measurement over a period of roughly four months. We identify thousands of vulnerable mail servers, some associated with high-profile mail providers. Even after private notifications and public disclosure of the vulnerabilities roughly 80% of the vulnerable servers remain vulnerable.
Nathaniel Bennett, Rebekah Sowards, Casey T. Deccio
IMC2