Modern HBM-based memory systems have evolved over generations while retaining cache line granularity accesses. Preserving this fine granularity necessitated the introduction of bank groups and pseudo channels. These structures expand timing parameters and control overhead, significantly increasing memory controller scheduling complexity. Large language models (LLMs) now dominate deep learning workloads, streaming contiguous data blocks ranging from several kilobytes to megabytes per operation. In a conventional HBM-based memory system, these transfers are fragmented into hundreds of 32B cache line transactions. This forces the memory controller to employ unnecessarily intricate scheduling, leading to growing inefficiency. To address this problem, we propose RoMe. RoMe accesses DRAM at row granularity and removes columns, bank groups, and pseudo channels from the memory interface. This design simplifies memory scheduling, thereby requiring fewer pins per channel. The freed pins are aggregated to form additional channels, increasing overall bandwidth by$\text{1 2. 5 \%}$with minimal extra pins. RoMe demonstrates how memory scheduling logic can be significantly simplified for representative LLM workloads, and presents an alternative approach for next-generation HBM-based memory systems achieving increased bandwidth with minimal hardware overhead.

A decade after its academic introduction, RowHammer (RH) remains a moving target that continues to challenge both the industry and academia. With its potential to serve as a critical attack vector, the ever-decreasing RH threshold now threatens DRAM process technology scaling, with a superlinearly increasing cost of RH protection solutions. Due to their generality and relatively lower performance costs, architectural RH solutions are the first line of defense against RH. However, the field is fragmented with varying views of the problem, terminologies, and even threat models. In this paper, we systematize architectural RH defenses from the last decade through the lens of streaming algorithms. We provide a taxonomy that encompasses 48 different works. We map multiple architectural RH defenses to the classical streaming algorithms, which extends to multiple proposals that did not identify this link. We also provide two practitioner guides. The first guide analyzes which algorithm best fits a given RHTH, location, process technology, storage type, and mitigative action. The second guide encourages future research to consult existing algorithms when architecting RH defenses. We illustrate this by demonstrating how Reservoir-Sampling can improve related RH defenses, and also introduce StickySampling that can provide mathematical security that related studies do not guarantee.

CXL has emerged as a promising memory interface that can cost-effectively expand the capacity and bandwidth of a memory system, complementing the traditional DDR interface. However, CXL DRAM presents 2-3x longer access latency than DDR DRAM, forming a tiered-memory system that demands an effective and efficient page-migration solution. Although many page-migration solutions have been proposed for past tiered-memory systems, they have achieved limited success. To tackle the challenge of managing tiered-memory systems, this work first presents a CXL-driven profiling solution to precisely and transparently count the number of accesses to every 4KB page and 64B word in CXL DRAM. Second, using the profiling solution, this work uncovers that (1) widely used CPU-driven page-migration solutions often identify warm pages as hot pages, and (2) certain applications have sparse hot pages, where only a small percentage of words in each of these pages are frequently accessed. Besides, this work demonstrates that the performance overhead of identifying hot pages is sometimes high enough to degrade application performance. Lastly, this work presents M5, a platform designed to facilitate the development of effective CXL-driven page-migration solutions, providing hardware-based hot-page and hot-word trackers in the CXL controller. On average, M5 can identify 47% hotter pages and offer 14% higher performance than the best CPU-driven page-migration solution, even with a simple policy.

Row Hammer (RH) has been demonstrated as a security vulnerability in modern systems. Although commodity CPUs can handle RH-induced single-bit errors in DRAM through ECC, RH can still give rise to multi-bit uncorrectable errors (UEs) and crash the systems. Meanwhile, recent work has indicated that the DRAM cells vulnerable to RH are determined by manufacturing imperfections and resulting defects. Taking one step further from the recent work, we first conduct RH experiments on contemporary DRAM modules for 3 weeks. This demonstrates that RH-induced UEs occur only at specific DRAM addresses (RH-UE-vulnerable addresses) and the percentage of such addresses is small in these DRAM modules. Second, to protect the systems from RH-induced UEs, we propose two RH defense solutions: H- and S-TAROT (TArgeted ROw-Hammer Therapy). H-TAROT is a software-based solution running on the host CPU. It obtains RH-UE-vulnerable addresses during the system boot and then periodically accesses such addresses before UEs may occur. Since it accesses only a small percentage of addresses, it does not incur a notable performance penalty for throughput applications (e.g., a 1.5% increase in execution time of the SPECrate 2017 benchmark suite running on a system even with 128GB of DRAM). Yet, it imposes a significant performance penalty on latency-sensitive applications (e.g., a 28.2% increase in tail latency of Redis). To minimize the performance penalty, for a system with a SmartNIC (SNIC), S-TAROT offloads H-TAROT from the host CPU to the SNIC CPU. Our experiment shows that S-TAROT increases the execution time and tail latency of the SPECrate 2017 benchmark suite and Redis by only 0.1% and 1.0%, respectively.

An embedding layer is one of the most critical building blocks of deep neural networks, especially for recommender systems and graph neural networks. The embedding layer dominates a large portion of the total execution time due to its large memory requirements and little data reuse in operations. To accelerate the embedding layers, dual in-line memory module (DIMM) based near-data processing architectures have been proposed. They amplify bandwidth by adding a processing unit to the DIMM’s buffer. However, prior architectures have less capacity scalability due to the limited number of memory channels. Crucially, they are limited in performance improvement due to the load imbalance problem and the limitations of DIMM-based memory systems with a multi-drop bus structure between the processing units and the host.

The demand for precise information on DRAM microarchitectures and error characteristics has surged, driven by the need to explore processing in memory, enhance reliability, and mitigate security vulnerability. Nonetheless, DRAM manufacturers have disclosed only a limited amount of information, making it difficult to find specific information on their DRAM microarchitectures. This paper addresses this gap by presenting more rigorous findings on the microarchitectures of commodity DRAM chips and their impacts on the characteristics of activate-induced bitflips (AIBs), such as RowHammer and RowPress. The previous studies have also attempted to understand the DRAM microarchitectures and associated behaviors, but we have found some of their results to be misled by inaccurate address mapping and internal data swizzling, or lack of a deeper understanding of the modern DRAM cell structure. For accurate and efficient reverse-engineering, we use three tools: AIBs, retention time test, and RowCopy, which can be cross-validated. With these three tools, we first take a macroscopic view of modern DRAM chips to uncover the size, structure, and operation of their subarrays, memory array tiles (MATs), and rows. Then, we analyze AIB characteristics based on the microscopic view of the DRAM microarchitecture, such as 6F2cell layout, through which we rectify misunderstandings regarding AIBs and discover a new data pattern that accelerates AIBs. Lastly, based on our findings at both macroscopic and microscopic levels, we identify previously unknown AIB vulnerabilities and propose a simple yet effective protection solution.

Graph Neural Network (GNN) models have attracted attention, given their high accuracy in interpreting graph data. One of the primary building blocks of a GNN model is aggregation, which gathers and averages the feature vectors corresponding to the nodes adjacent to each node. Aggregation works by multiplying the adjacency and feature matrices. The size of both matrices exceeds the on-chip cache capacity for many realistic datasets, and the adjacency matrix is highly sparse. These characteristics lead to little data reuse, causing intensive main-memory accesses during the aggregation process. Thus, aggregation exhibits memory-intensive characteristics and dominates most of the total execution time. In this paper, we propose GraNDe, an NDP architecture that accelerates memory-intensive aggregation operations by locating NDP modules near DRAM datapath to exploit rank-level parallelism. GraNDe maximizes bandwidth utilization by separating the memory channel path with the buffer chip in between so that pre-/post-processing in the host processor and reduction in NDP modules operate simultaneously. By exploring the preferred data mappings of the operand matrices to DRAM ranks, we architect GraNDe to support adaptive matrix mapping that applies the optimal mapping for each layer depending on the dimension of the layer and the configuration of a memory system. We also propose adj-bundle broadcasting and re-tiling optimizations to reduce the transfer time for adjacency matrix data and to improve feature vector data reusability by exploiting tiling with consideration of adjacency between nodes. GraNDe achieves 3.01× and 1.69× on average, and up to$4.00\times$and$1.98\times$speedups of GCN aggregation over the baseline system and the state-of-the-art NDP architecture for GCN, respectively.

Error-correcting code (ECC) has been widely used in DRAM-based memory systems to address the exacerbating random errors following the fabrication process scaling. However, ECCs including the strong form of Chipkill have not been so effective against Row Hammer (RH), which incurs bursts of errors discretely corrupting the whole row beyond the ECC correction capability.