Fact-checking tabular data is essential for ensuring the accuracy of structured information.However, existing methods often rely on blackbox models with opaque reasoning.We introduce RePanda, a structured fact verification approach that translates claims into executable pandas queries, enabling interpretable and verifiable reasoning.

The advent of text-to-image generative models has led artists to worry that their individual styles may be copied, creating a pressing need to reconsider the lack of protection for artistic styles under copyright law. This requires answering challenging questions, like what defines style and what constitutes style infringment. In this work, we build on prior legal scholarship to develop an automatic and interpretable framework to \emph{quantitatively} assess style infringement. Our methods hinge on a simple logical argument: if an artist's works can consistently be recognized as their own, then they have a unique style. Based on this argument, we introduce ArtSavant, a practical (i.e., efficient and easy to understand) tool to (i) determine the unique style of an artist by comparing it to a reference corpus of works from hundreds of artists, and (ii) recognize if the identified style reappears in generated images. We then apply ArtSavant in an empirical study to quantify the prevalence of artistic style copying across 3 popular text-to-image generative models, finding that under simple prompting, $20\\%$ of $372$ prolific artists studied appear to have their styles be at risk of copying by today's generative models. Our findings show that prior legal arguments can be operationalized in quantitative ways, towards more nuanced examination of the issue of artistic style infringements.

In light of recent advancements in generative AI models, it has become essential to distinguish genuine content from AI-generated one to prevent the malicious usage of fake materials as authentic ones and vice versa. Various techniques have been introduced for identifying AI-generated images, with watermarking emerging as a promising approach. In this paper, we analyze the robustness of various AI-image detectors including watermarking and classifier-based deepfake detectors. For watermarking methods that introduce subtle image perturbations (i.e., low perturbation budget methods), we reveal a fundamental trade-off between the evasion error rate (i.e., the fraction of watermarked images detected as non-watermarked ones) and the spoofing error rate (i.e., the fraction of non-watermarked images detected as watermarked ones) upon an application of a diffusion purification attack. In this regime, we also empirically show that diffusion purification effectively removes watermarks with minimal changes to images. For high perturbation watermarking methods where notable changes are applied to images, the diffusion purification attack is not effective. In this case, we develop a model substitution adversarial attack that can successfully remove watermarks. Moreover, we show that watermarking methods are vulnerable to spoofing attacks where the attacker aims to have real images (potentially obscene) identified as watermarked ones, damaging the reputation of the developers. In particular, by just having black-box access to the watermarking method, we show that one can generate a watermarked noise image which can be added to the real images to have them falsely flagged as watermarked ones. Finally, we extend our theory to characterize a fundamental trade-off between the robustness and reliability of classifier-based deep fake detectors and demonstrate it through experiments. Code is available at https://github.com/mehrdadsaberi/watermark_robustness.

In this paper, we introduce a novel class of fast, beam search-based adversarial attack (BEAST) for Language Models (LMs). BEAST employs interpretable parameters, enabling attackers to balance between attack speed, success rate, and the readability of adversarial prompts. The computational efficiency of BEAST facilitates us to investigate its applications on LMs for jailbreaking, eliciting hallucinations, and privacy attacks. Our gradient-free targeted attack can jailbreak aligned LMs with high attack success rates within one minute. For instance, BEAST can jailbreak Vicuna-7B-v1.5 under one minute with a success rate of 89% when compared to a gradient-based baseline that takes over an hour to achieve 70% success rate using a single Nvidia RTX A6000 48GB GPU. BEAST can also generate adversarial suffixes for successful jailbreaks that can transfer to unseen prompts and unseen models such as GPT-4-Turbo. Additionally, we discover a unique outcome wherein our untargeted attack induces hallucinations in LM chatbots. Through human evaluations, we find that our untargeted attack causes Vicuna-7B-v1.5 to produce $\sim$15% more incorrect outputs when compared to LM outputs in the absence of our attack. We also learn that 22% of the time, BEAST causes Vicuna to generate outputs that are not relevant to the original prompt. Further, we use BEAST to generate adversarial prompts in a few seconds that can boost the performance of existing membership inference attacks for LMs. We believe that our fast attack, BEAST, has the potential to accelerate research in LM security and privacy.

Deep neural networks can be unreliable in the real world when the training set does not adequately cover all the settings where they are deployed. Focusing on image classification, we consider the setting where we have an error distribution $\mathcal{E}$ representing a deployment scenario where the model fails. We have access to a small set of samples ${\mathcal{E}_{{\text{sample}}}}$ from $\mathcal{E}$ and it can be expensive to obtain additional samples. In the traditional model development framework, mitigating failures of the model in $\mathcal{E}$ can be challenging and is often done in an ad hoc manner. In this paper, we propose a general methodology for model debugging that can systemically improve model performance on $\mathcal{E}$ while maintaining its performance on the original test set. Our key assumption is that we have access to a large pool of weakly (noisily) labeled data $\mathcal{F}$. However, naively adding $\mathcal{F}$ to the training would hurt model performance due to the large extent of label noise. Our Data-Centric Debugging (DCD) framework carefully creates a debug-train set by selecting images from $\mathcal{F}$ that are visually similar to the images in ${\mathcal{E}_{{\text{sample}}}}$. To do this, we use the ℓ2distance in the feature space (penultimate layer activations) of various models including ResNet, Robust ResNet and DINO where we observe DINO ViTs are significantly better at discovering similar images compared to Resnets. Compared to the baselines that maintain model performance on the test set, we achieve significantly (+9.45%) improved results on the debug-heldout sets.

In data poisoning attacks, an adversary tries to change a model’s prediction by adding, modifying, or removing samples in the training data. Recently, ensemble-based approaches for obtaining provable defenses against data poisoning have been proposed where predictions are done by taking a majority vote across multiple base models. In this work, we show that merely considering the majority vote in ensemble defenses is wasteful as it does not effectively utilize available information in the logits layers of the base models. Instead, we propose Run-Off Election (ROE), a novel aggregation method based on a two-round election across the base models: In the first round, models vote for their preferred class and then a second, Run-Off election is held between the top two classes in the first round. Based on this approach, we propose DPA+ROE and FA+ROE defense methods based on Deep Partition Aggregation (DPA) and Finite Aggregation (FA) approaches from prior work. We evaluate our methods on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and GTSRB and obtain improvements in certified accuracy by up to $3%$-$4%$. Also, by applying ROE on a boosted version of DPA, we gain improvements around $12%$-$27%$ comparing to the current state-of-the-art, establishing a new state-of-the-art in (pointwise) certified robustness against data poisoning. In many cases, our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art, even when using 32 times less computational power.