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James Beetham

dblp:334/6580 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
2as first author
3since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Trustworthy machine learning · 60% Vision and language · 40%
Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Computer vision › Vision and language › vision-language model › vision-language model adaptation
CLIP fine-tuning
1.012026
SafeR-CLIP: Mitigating NSFW Content in Vision-Language Models While Preserving Pre-Trained Knowledge · AAAI 2026
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
distributional shift
1.012026
SafeR-CLIP: Mitigating NSFW Content in Vision-Language Models While Preserving Pre-Trained Knowledge · AAAI 2026
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness
1.012026
SafeR-CLIP: Mitigating NSFW Content in Vision-Language Models While Preserving Pre-Trained Knowledge · AAAI 2026
Computer vision › Vision and language
vision-language model
1.012026
SafeR-CLIP: Mitigating NSFW Content in Vision-Language Models While Preserving Pre-Trained Knowledge · AAAI 2026
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › generative model safety
vision-language model safety
1.012026
SafeR-CLIP: Mitigating NSFW Content in Vision-Language Models While Preserving Pre-Trained Knowledge · AAAI 2026
Security and privacy of machine learning › model stealing
data-free model stealing
0.712023
Dual Student Networks for Data-Free Model Stealing · ICLR 2023
Security and privacy of machine learning
model stealing
0.712023
Dual Student Networks for Data-Free Model Stealing · ICLR 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

proximity-aware fine-tuning · 1.0minimal intervention · 1.0knowledge distillation · 0.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 SafeR-CLIP: Mitigating NSFW Content in Vision-Language Models While Preserving Pre-Trained Knowledge
abstract
Improving the safety of vision-language models like CLIP via fine-tuning often comes at a steep price, causing significant drops in their generalization performance. We find this trade-off stems from rigid alignment strategies that force unsafe concepts toward single, predefined safe targets, disrupting the model's learned semantic structure. To address this, we propose a proximity-aware approach: redirecting unsafe concepts to their semantically closest safe alternatives to minimize representational change. We introduce SafeR-CLIP, a fine-tuning framework that applies this principle of minimal intervention. SafeR-CLIP successfully reconciles safety and performance, recovering up to 8.0% in zero-shot accuracy over prior methods while maintaining robust safety. To support more rigorous evaluation, we also contribute NSFWCaps, a new benchmark of 1,000 highly-aligned pairs for testing safety under distributional shift. Our work shows that respecting the geometry of pretrained representations is key to achieving safety without sacrificing performance.
Adeel Yousaf, Joseph Fioresi, James Beetham, Amrit Singh Bedi, Mubarak Shah
AAAI3
2023 Dual Student Networks for Data-Free Model Stealing
James Beetham, Navid Kardan, Ajmal Mian, Mubarak Shah
ICLR1
2022 Detecting Compromised Architecture/Weights of a Deep Model
abstract
Adversarial attacks perturb data to modify a model’s prediction. These perturbations can be crafted in a white-box or black-box setting, depending on whether the target model architecture/weights are known or unknown. Compromised architecture and weights of a model makes it vulnerable to the more powerful white-box attacks. In this work, we determine if a deep model is compromised by distinguishing white-box from black-box adversarial attacks. The proposed method utilizes the internal representations of the target model and a proxy model to increase the detector efficacy. Additionally, it employs a spatial smoothing module to control the strength of white-box attacks relative to black-box attacks, and a proxy module to aid in measuring the transferability of the attack. Both modules work in tandem to increase the contrast of the internal representations between white-box and black-box attacks for better discrimination. We perform a detailed ablation of our method to showcase the importance of the different modules, and show that the spatial smoothing and proxy defense techniques enable our framework to significantly outperform the simple classification baseline on common vision datasets.
James Beetham, Navid Kardan, Ajmal Mian, Mubarak Shah
ICPR1