EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Jianshuo Dong
dblp:335/5790
· DBLP profile ↗
7ranked-venue papers
4as first author
7since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0002-4576-7822ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 4 · 4 first-author · 4 since 2021Security and privacy · 3 · 3 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Revisiting the Reliability of Language Models in Instruction-FollowingabstractAdvanced LLMs have achieved near-ceiling instruction-following accuracy on benchmarks such as IFEVAL.However, these impressive scores do not necessarily translate to reliable services in real-world use, where users often vary their phrasing, contextual framing, and task formulations.In this paper, we study nuance-oriented reliability: whether models exhibit consistent competence across cousin prompts that convey analogous user intents but with subtle nuances.To quantify this, we introduce a new metric, reliable@k, and develop an automated pipeline that generates high-quality cousin prompts via data augmentation.Building upon this, we construct IFE-VAL++ for systematic evaluation.Across 20 proprietary and 26 open-source LLMs, we find that current models exhibit substantial insufficiency in nuance-oriented reliability-their performance can drop by up to 61.8% with nuanced prompt modifications.What's more, we characterize it and explore three potential improvement recipes.Our findings highlight nuance-oriented reliability as a crucial yet underexplored next step toward more dependable and trustworthy LLM behavior.Our code and benchmark are accessible: https: //github.com/jianshuod/IFEval-pp. Jianshuo Dong, Liu Yan, Zhenyu Zhong, Tao Wei 0002, Chao Zhang 0008, Han Qiu 0001 |
ACL (1) | 1 |
| 2026 | DREAM: Scalable Red Teaming for Text-to-Image Generative Systems via Distribution ModelingabstractDespite the integration of safety alignment and external filters, text-to-image (T2I) generative systems are still susceptible to producing harmful content, such as sexual or violent imagery. This raises serious concerns about unintended exposure and potential misuse. Red teaming, which aims to proactively identify diverse prompts that can elicit unsafe outputs from the T2I system, is increasingly recognized as an essential method for assessing and improving safety before real-world deployment. However, existing automated red teaming approaches often treat prompt discovery as an isolated, prompt-level optimization task, which limits their scalability, diversity, and overall effectiveness. To bridge this gap, in this paper, we propose DREAM, a scalable red teaming framework to automatically uncover diverse problematic prompts from a given T2I system. Unlike prior work that optimizes prompts individually, DREAM directly models the probabilistic distribution of the target system's problematic prompts, which enables explicit optimization over both effectiveness and diversity, and allows efficient large-scale sampling after training. To achieve this without direct access to representative training samples, we draw inspiration from energy-based models and reformulate the objective into a simple and tractable form. We further introduce GC-SPSA, an efficient optimization algorithm that provides stable gradient estimates through the long and potentially non-differentiable T2I pipeline. During inference, we also propose a diversity-aware sampling strategy to enhance prompt variety. The effectiveness of DREAM is validated through extensive experiments, demonstrating state-of-the-art performance across a wide range of T2I models and safety filters in terms of both prompt success rate and diversity. Our code is available at https://github.com/AntigoneRandy/DREAM Boheng Li, Junjie Wang 0007, Yiming Li 0004, Zhiyang Hu, Leyi Qi, Jianshuo Dong, Run Wang 0001, Han Qiu 0001, Zhan Qin, Tianwei Zhang 0004 |
SP | 6 |
| 2025 | "I've Decided to Leak": Probing Internals Behind Prompt Leakage IntentsabstractLarge language models (LLMs) exhibit prompt leakage vulnerabilities, where they may be coaxed into revealing system prompts embedded in LLM services, raising intellectual property and confidentiality concerns.An intriguing question arises: Do LLMs genuinely internalize prompt leakage intents in their hidden states before generating tokens?In this work, we use probing techniques to capture LLMs' intent-related internal representations and confirm that the answer is yes.We start by comprehensively inducing prompt leakage behaviors across diverse system prompts, attack queries, and decoding methods.We develop a hybrid labeling pipeline, enabling the identification of broader prompt leakage behaviors beyond mere verbatim leaks.Our results show that a simple linear probe can predict prompt leakage risks from pre-generation hidden states without generating any tokens.Across all tested models, linear probes consistently achieve 90%+ AUROC, even when applied to new system prompts and attacks.Understanding the model internals behind prompt leakage drives practical applications, including intention-based detection of prompt leakage risks. Jianshuo Dong, Liu Yan, Zhenyu Zhong, Tao Wei 0002, Ke Xu 0002, Minlie Huang, Chao Zhang 0008, Han Qiu 0001 |
EMNLP | 1 |
| 2025 | An Engorgio Prompt Makes Large Language Model Babble onabstractAuto-regressive large language models (LLMs) have yielded impressive performance in many real-world tasks.
However, the new paradigm of these LLMs also exposes novel threats.
In this paper, we explore their vulnerability to inference cost attacks, where a malicious user crafts Engorgio prompts to intentionally increase the computation cost and latency of the inference process. We design Engorgio, a novel methodology, to efficiently generate adversarial Engorgio prompts to affect the target LLM's service availability. Engorgio has the following two technical contributions.
(1) We employ a parameterized distribution to track LLMs' prediction trajectory. (2) Targeting the auto-regressive nature of LLMs' inference process, we propose novel loss functions to stably suppress the appearance of the <EOS> token, whose occurrence will interrupt the LLM's generation process.
We conduct extensive experiments on 13 open-sourced LLMs with parameters ranging from 125M to 30B.
The results show that Engorgio prompts can successfully induce LLMs to generate abnormally long outputs (i.e., roughly 2-13$\times$ longer to reach 90\%+ of the output length limit)
in a white-box scenario and our real-world experiment demonstrates Engergio's threat to LLM service with limited computing resources.
The code is released at https://github.com/jianshuod/Engorgio-prompt. Jianshuo Dong, Tianwei Zhang 0004, Hao Wang 0003, Hewu Li, Qi Li 0002, Chao Zhang 0008, Ke Xu 0002, Han Qiu 0001 |
ICLR | 1 |
| 2023 | One-bit Flip is All You Need: When Bit-flip Attack Meets Model TrainingabstractDeep neural networks (DNNs) are widely deployed on real-world devices. Concerns regarding their security have gained great attention from researchers. Recently, a new weight modification attack called bit flip attack (BFA) was proposed, which exploits memory fault inject techniques such as row hammer to attack quantized models in the deployment stage. With only a few bit flips, the target model can be rendered useless as a random guesser or even be implanted with malicious functionalities. In this work, we seek to further reduce the number of bit flips. We propose a training-assisted bit flip attack, in which the adversary is involved in the training stage to build a high-risk model to release. This high-risk model, obtained coupled with a corresponding malicious model, behaves normally and can escape various detection methods. The results on benchmark datasets show that an adversary can easily convert this high-risk but normal model to a malicious one on victim’s side by flipping only one critical bit on average in the deployment stage. Moreover, our attack still poses a significant threat even when defenses are employed. The codes for reproducing main experiments are available at https://github.com/jianshuod/TBA. Jianshuo Dong, Han Qiu 0001, Yiming Li 0004, Tianwei Zhang 0004, Yuanjie Li, Zeqi Lai, Chao Zhang 0008, Shutao Xia |
ICCV | 1 |
| 2023 | D-DAE: Defense-Penetrating Model Extraction AttacksabstractRecent studies show that machine learning models are vulnerable to model extraction attacks, where the adversary builds a substitute model that achieves almost the same performance of a black-box victim model simply via querying the victim model. To defend against such attacks, a series of methods have been proposed to disrupt the query results before returning them to potential attackers, greatly degrading the performance of existing model extraction attacks.In this paper, we make the first attempt to develop a defense-penetrating model extraction attack framework, named D-DAE, which aims to break disruption-based defenses. The linchpins of D-DAE are the design of two modules, i.e., disruption detection and disruption recovery, which can be integrated with generic model extraction attacks. More specifically, after obtaining query results from the victim model, the disruption detection module infers the defense mechanism adopted by the defender. We design a meta-learning-based disruption detection algorithm for learning the fundamental differences between the distributions of disrupted and undisrupted query results. The algorithm features a good generalization property even if we have no access to the original training dataset of the victim model. Given the detected defense mechanism, the disruption recovery module tries to restore a clean query result from the disrupted query result with well-designed generative models. Our extensive evaluations on MNIST, FashionMNIST, CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and ImageNette datasets demonstrate that D-DAE can enhance the substitute model accuracy of the existing model extraction attacks by as much as 82.24% in the face of 4 state-of-the-art defenses and combinations of multiple defenses. We also verify the effectiveness of D-DAE in penetrating unknown defenses in real-world APIs hosted by Microsoft Azure and Face++. Yanjiao Chen, Xueluan Gong, Jianshuo Dong, Meng Xue 0001 |
SP | 4 |
| 2022 | ATTEQ-NN: Attention-based QoE-aware Evasive Backdoor Attacks
Xueluan Gong, Yanjiao Chen, Jianshuo Dong, Qian Wang 0002 |
NDSS | 3 |