Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Ryan Ofman
dblp:336/2985
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Speech recognition and synthesis · 100% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Natural language and speech › Speech recognition and synthesis › speech anti-spoofing
audio deepfake detection |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | What You Read Isn't What You Hear: Linguistic Sensitivity in Deepfake Speech Detection · EMNLP 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Speech recognition and synthesis
speech anti-spoofing |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | What You Read Isn't What You Hear: Linguistic Sensitivity in Deepfake Speech Detection · EMNLP 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | What You Read Isn't What You Hear: Linguistic Sensitivity in Deepfake Speech Detection · EMNLP 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
audio adversarial attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | What You Read Isn't What You Hear: Linguistic Sensitivity in Deepfake Speech Detection · EMNLP 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
transcript-to-audio perturbation · 1.7feature attribution analysis · 1.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | What You Read Isn't What You Hear: Linguistic Sensitivity in Deepfake Speech DetectionabstractRecent advances in text-to-speech technology have enabled highly realistic voice generation, fueling audio-based deepfake attacks such as fraud and impersonation.While audio antispoofing systems are critical for detecting such threats, prior research has predominantly focused on acoustic-level perturbations, leaving the impact of linguistic variation largely unexplored.In this paper, we investigate the linguistic sensitivity of both open-source and commercial anti-spoofing detectors by introducing TAPAS (Transcript-to-Audio Perturbation Anti-Spoofing), a novel framework for transcript-level adversarial attacks.Our extensive evaluation shows that even minor linguistic perturbations can significantly degrade detection accuracy: attack success rates exceed 60% on several open-source detector-voice pairs, and the accuracy of one commercial detector drops from 100% on synthetic audio to just 32%.Through a comprehensive feature attribution analysis, we find that linguistic complexity and model-level audio embedding similarity are key factors contributing to detector vulnerabilities.To illustrate the real-world risks, we replicate a recent Brad Pitt audio deepfake scam and demonstrate that TAPAS can bypass commercial detectors.These findings underscore the need to move beyond purely acoustic defenses and incorporate linguistic variation into the design of robust anti-spoofing systems.Our source code is available at https: //github.com/nqbinh17/audio_linguist ic_adversarial. Shuju Shi, Ryan Ofman, Thai Le |
EMNLP | 3 |