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Shayan Chashm Jahan

dblp:336/6086 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
2 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 62% Approximation and online algorithms · 25% Combinatorics and discrete mathematics · 13%

Topics — the 8 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
fair division
1.422024
Fairness and Efficiency in Online Class Matching · NeurIPS 2024
Rainbow Cycle Number and EFX Allocations: (Almost) Closing the Gap · IJCAI 2023
Approximation and online algorithms › online algorithms
online matching
0.812024
Fairness and Efficiency in Online Class Matching · NeurIPS 2024
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › fair division
price of fairness
0.812024
Fairness and Efficiency in Online Class Matching · NeurIPS 2024
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › fair division › envy-freeness
EFX allocation
0.712023
Rainbow Cycle Number and EFX Allocations: (Almost) Closing the Gap · IJCAI 2023
Combinatorics and discrete mathematics
extremal combinatorics
0.712023
Rainbow Cycle Number and EFX Allocations: (Almost) Closing the Gap · IJCAI 2023
Approximation and online algorithms
approximation algorithms
0.212024
Fairness and Efficiency in Online Class Matching · NeurIPS 2024
Approximation and online algorithms › online algorithms
randomized online algorithms
0.212024
Fairness and Efficiency in Online Class Matching · NeurIPS 2024
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › fair division
indivisible goods allocation
0.212023
Rainbow Cycle Number and EFX Allocations: (Almost) Closing the Gap · IJCAI 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

randomized rounding · 0.8lower bound construction · 0.8approximation algorithm · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Fairness and Efficiency in Online Class Matching
abstract
The online bipartite matching problem, extensively studied in the literature, deals with the allocation of online arriving vertices (items) to a predetermined set of offline vertices (agents). However, little attention has been given to the concept of class fairness, where agents are categorized into different classes, and the matching algorithm must ensure equitable distribution across these classes. We here focus on randomized algorithms for the fair matching of indivisible items, subject to various definitions of fairness. Our main contribution is the first (randomized) non-wasteful algorithm that simultaneously achieves a $1/2$ approximation to class envy-freeness (CEF) while simultaneously ensuring an equivalent approximation to the class proportionality (CPROP) and utilitarian social welfare (USW) objectives. We supplement this result by demonstrating that no non-wasteful algorithm can achieve an $\alpha$-CEF guarantee for $\alpha > 0.761$. In a similar vein, we provide a novel input instance for deterministic divisible matching that demonstrates a nearly tight CEF approximation. Lastly, we define the ``price of fairness," which represents the trade-off between optimal and fair matching. We demonstrate that increasing the level of fairness in the approximation of the solution leads to a decrease in the objective of maximizing USW, following an inverse proportionality relationship.
Mohammad Hajiaghayi, Shayan Chashm Jahan, Suho Shin 0001, Max Springer
NeurIPS2
2023 Rainbow Cycle Number and EFX Allocations: (Almost) Closing the Gap
abstract
Recently, some studies on the fair allocation of indivisible goods notice a connection between a purely combinatorial problem called the Rainbow Cycle problem and a fairness notion known as EFX: assuming that the rainbow cycle number for parameter d (i.e. R(d)) is O(d^β .log(d)^γ), we can find a (1 − ϵ)-EFX allocation with O_ϵ(n^(β/β+1) .log(n)^(γ/β+1)) number of discarded goods. The best upper bound on R(d) is improved in a series of works to O(d^4), O(d^(2+o(1))), and finally to O(d^2). Also, via a simple observation, we have R(d) ∈ Ω(d). In this paper, we introduce another problem in extremal combinatorics. For a parameter l, we define the rainbow path degree and denote it by H(l). We show that any lower bound on H(l) yields an upper bound on R(d). Next, we prove that H(l) ∈ Ω(l^2 / log(l)) which yields an almost tight upper bound of R(d) ∈ Ω(d.log(d)). This, in turn, proves the existence of (1−ϵ)-EFX allocation with O_ϵ(√n .log(n)) number of discarded goods. In addition, for the special case of the Rainbow Cycle problem that the edges in each part form a permutation, we improve the upper bound to R(d) ≤ 2d−4. We leverage H(l) to achieve this bound. Our conjecture is that the exact value of H(l) is ⌊l^2/2⌋ − 1. We provide some experiments that support this conjecture. Assuming this conjecture is correct, we have R(d) ∈ θ(d).
Shayan Chashm Jahan, Masoud Seddighin, Seyed-Mohammad Seyed-Javadi
IJCAI1