Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.

Jules Baudrin

dblp:337/2519 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0004-5844-2845ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
stream cipher
0.912025
Transistor: a TFHE-Friendly Stream Cipher · CRYPTO (5) 2025
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › homomorphic encryption
fully homomorphic encryption
0.312025
Transistor: a TFHE-Friendly Stream Cipher · CRYPTO (5) 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

TFHE · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Transistor: a TFHE-Friendly Stream Cipher
Jules Baudrin, Sonia Belaïd, Nicolas Bon 0001, Christina Boura, Anne Canteaut, Gaëtan Leurent, Pascal Paillier, Léo Perrin, Matthieu Rivain, Yann Rotella, Samuel Tap
CRYPTO (5)1
2025 Commutative cryptanalysis as a generalization of differential cryptanalysis
abstract
Abstract Recently, Baudrin et al. analyzed a special case of Wagner’s commutative diagram cryptanalysis, referred to as commutative cryptanalysis. For a family $$(E_k)_k$$ ( E k ) k of permutations on a finite vector space G, commutative cryptanalysis exploits the existence of affine permutations $$A,B :G \rightarrow G$$ A , B : G → G , $$I \notin \{A,B\}$$ I ∉ { A , B } such that $$E_k \circ A (x) = B \circ E_k(x)$$ E k ∘ A ( x ) = B ∘ E k ( x ) holds with high probability, taken over inputs x, for a significantly large set of weak keys k. Several attacks against symmetric cryptographic primitives can be formulated within the framework of commutative cryptanalysis, most importantly differential attacks, as well as rotational and rotational-differential attacks. Besides, the notion of c-differentials on S-boxes can be analyzed as a special case within this framework. We discuss the relations between a general notion of commutative cryptanalysis, with A and B being arbitrary functions over a finite Abelian group, and differential cryptanalysis, both from the view of conducting an attack on a symmetric cryptographic primitive, as well as from the view of a theoretical study of cryptographic S-boxes.
Jules Baudrin, Christof Beierle, Patrick Felke, Gregor Leander, Patrick Neumann 0004, Léo Perrin, Lukas Stennes
Des. Codes Cryptogr.1