Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Luxi He
dblp:338/9240
· DBLP profile ↗
6ranked-venue papers
1as first author
6since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 6 · 1 first-author · 6 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
6 papers |
Language models and text generation · 39% Trustworthy machine learning · 34% Vision and language · 16% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% |
Topics — the 11 heaviest of 14, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › large language model training
language model pretraining |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Metadata Conditioning Accelerates Language Model Pre-training · ICML 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › model steering
language model steering |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Metadata Conditioning Accelerates Language Model Pre-training · ICML 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › text generation › large language model generation
prompt-based generation |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Fantastic Copyrighted Beasts and How (Not) to Generate Them · ICLR 2025 |
Machine learning › Generative modeling › diffusion model
text-to-image generation |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Fantastic Copyrighted Beasts and How (Not) to Generate Them · ICLR 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › poisoning attack
fine-tuning attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | On Evaluating the Durability of Safeguards for Open-Weight LLMs · ICLR 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
large language model safety |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | On Evaluating the Durability of Safeguards for Open-Weight LLMs · ICLR 2025 |
Computer vision › Vision and language › vision-language model › multimodal large language model
chart understanding |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | CharXiv: Charting Gaps in Realistic Chart Understanding in Multimodal LLMs · NeurIPS 2024 |
Computer vision › Vision and language › vision-language model
multimodal large language model |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | CharXiv: Charting Gaps in Realistic Chart Understanding in Multimodal LLMs · NeurIPS 2024 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
fairness |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Aleatoric and Epistemic Discrimination: Fundamental Limits of Fairness Interventions · NeurIPS 2023 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › fairness › bias mitigation
fairness intervention |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Aleatoric and Epistemic Discrimination: Fundamental Limits of Fairness Interventions · NeurIPS 2023 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | On Evaluating the Durability of Safeguards for Open-Weight LLMs · ICLR 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
red-teaming · 0.9red teaming · 0.9prompt rewriting · 0.9negative prompting · 0.9metadata conditioning · 0.9human-in-the-loop · 0.9fine-tuning · 0.9cooldown phase · 0.9LLM-as-a-judge · 0.9human expert curation · 0.8blackwell's comparison of statistical experiments · 0.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Fantastic Copyrighted Beasts and How (Not) to Generate ThemabstractRecent studies show that image and video generation models can be prompted to reproduce copyrighted content from their training data, raising serious legal con- cerns about copyright infringement. Copyrighted characters (e.g., Mario, Batman) present a significant challenge: at least one lawsuit has already awarded damages based on the generation of such characters. Consequently, commercial services like DALL·E have started deploying interventions. However, little research has systematically examined these problems: (1) Can users easily prompt models to generate copyrighted characters, even if it is unintentional?; (2) How effective are the existing mitigation strategies? To address these questions, we introduce a novel evaluation framework with metrics that assess both the generated image’s similarity to copyrighted characters and its consistency with user intent, grounded in a set of popular copyrighted characters from diverse studios and regions. We show that state-of-the-art image and video generation models can still generate characters even if characters’ names are not explicitly mentioned, sometimes with only two generic keywords (e.g., prompting with “videogame, plumber” consistently gener- ates Nintendo’s Mario character). We also introduce semi-automatic techniques to identify such keywords or descriptions that trigger character generation. Using this framework, we evaluate mitigation strategies, including prompt rewriting and new approaches we propose. Our findings reveal that common methods, such as DALL·E’s prompt rewriting, are insufficient alone and require supplementary strategies like negative prompting. Our work provides empirical grounding for discussions on copyright mitigation strategies and offers actionable insights for model deployers implementing these safeguards. Luxi He, Yangsibo Huang, Tinghao Xie, Luke Zettlemoyer, Chiyuan Zhang, Danqi Chen 0001, Peter Henderson 0002 |
ICLR | 1 |
| 2025 | On Evaluating the Durability of Safeguards for Open-Weight LLMsabstractMany stakeholders---from model developers to policymakers---seek to minimize the risks of large language models (LLMs). Key to this goal is whether technical safeguards can impede the misuse of LLMs, even when models are customizable via fine-tuning or when model weights are openly available. Several recent studies have proposed methods to produce durable LLM safeguards for open-weight LLMs that can withstand adversarial modifications of the model's weights via fine-tuning. This holds the promise of raising adversaries' costs even under strong threat models where adversaries can directly fine-tune parameters. However, we caution against over-reliance on such methods in their current state. Through several case studies, we demonstrate that even the evaluation of these defenses is exceedingly difficult and can easily mislead audiences into thinking that safeguards are more durable than they really are. We draw lessons from the failure modes that we identify and suggest that future research carefully cabin claims to more constrained, well-defined, and rigorously examined threat models, which can provide useful and candid assessments to stakeholders. Xiangyu Qi, Boyi Wei, Nicholas Carlini, Yangsibo Huang, Tinghao Xie, Luxi He, Matthew Jagielski, Milad Nasr, Prateek Mittal, Peter Henderson 0002 |
ICLR | 6 |
| 2025 | SORRY-Bench: Systematically Evaluating Large Language Model Safety RefusalabstractEvaluating aligned large language models' (LLMs) ability to recognize and reject unsafe user requests is crucial for safe, policy-compliant deployments. Existing evaluation efforts, however, face three limitations that we address with **SORRY-Bench**, our proposed benchmark. **First**, existing methods often use coarse-grained taxonomies of unsafe topics, and are over-representing some fine-grained topics. For example, among the ten existing datasets that we evaluated, tests for refusals of self-harm instructions are over 3x less represented than tests for fraudulent activities. SORRY-Bench improves on this by using a fine-grained taxonomy of 44 potentially unsafe topics, and 440 class-balanced unsafe instructions, compiled through human-in-the-loop methods. **Second**, evaluations often overlook the linguistic formatting of prompts, like different languages, dialects, and more --- which are only implicitly considered in many evaluations. We supplement SORRY-bench with 20 diverse linguistic augmentations to systematically examine these effects. **Third**, existing evaluations rely on large LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for evaluation, which can be computationally expensive. We investigate design choices for creating a fast, accurate automated safety evaluator. By collecting 7K+ human annotations and conducting a meta-evaluation of diverse LLM-as-a-judge designs, we show that fine-tuned 7B LLMs can achieve accuracy comparable to GPT-4 scale LLMs, with lower computational cost. Putting these together, we evaluate over 50 proprietary and open-weight LLMs on SORRY-Bench, analyzing their distinctive safety refusal behaviors. We hope our effort provides a building block for systematic evaluations of LLMs' safety refusal capabilities, in a balanced, granular, and efficient manner. Benchmark demo, data, code, and models are available through [https://sorry-bench.github.io](https://sorry-bench.github.io). Tinghao Xie, Xiangyu Qi, Yi Zeng 0005, Yangsibo Huang, T. W. U. Madhushani, Kaixuan Huang, Luxi He, Boyi Wei, Dacheng Li, Ying Sheng 0007, Ruoxi Jia 0001, Bo Li 0026, Kai Li 0001, Danqi Chen 0001, Peter Henderson 0002, Prateek Mittal |
ICLR | 7 |
| 2025 | Metadata Conditioning Accelerates Language Model Pre-trainingabstractThe vast diversity of styles, domains, and quality levels present in language model pre-training corpora is essential in developing general model capabilities, but efficiently learning and deploying the correct behaviors exemplified in each of these heterogeneous data sources is challenging. To address this, we propose a new method, termed Metadata Conditioning then Cooldown (MeCo), to incorporate additional learning cues during pre-training. MeCo first provides metadata (e.g., URLs like en.wikipedia.org) alongside the text during training and later uses a cooldown phase with only the standard text, thereby enabling the model to function normally even without metadata. MeCo significantly accelerates pre-training across different model scales (600M to 8B parameters) and training sources (C4, RefinedWeb, and DCLM). For instance, a 1.6B language model trained with MeCo matches the downstream task performance of standard pre-training while using 33% less data. Additionally, MeCo enables us to steer language models by conditioning the inference prompt on either real or fabricated metadata that encodes the desired properties of the output: for example, prepending wikipedia.org to reduce harmful generations or factquizmaster.com (fabricated) to improve common knowledge task performance. We also demonstrate that MeCo is compatible with different types of metadata, such as model-generated topics. MeCo is remarkably simple, adds no computational overhead, and demonstrates promise in producing more capable and steerable language models. Tianyu Gao 0001, Alexander Wettig, Luxi He, Yihe Dong, Sadhika Malladi, Danqi Chen 0001 |
ICML | 3 |
| 2024 | CharXiv: Charting Gaps in Realistic Chart Understanding in Multimodal LLMsabstractChart understanding plays a pivotal role when applying Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) to real-world tasks such as analyzing scientific papers or financial reports. However, existing datasets often focus on oversimplified and homogeneous charts with template-based questions, leading to an overly optimistic measure of progress. We demonstrate that although open-source models can appear to outperform strong proprietary models on these benchmarks, a simple stress test with slightly different charts or questions deteriorates performance by up to 34.5%. In this work, we propose CharXiv, a comprehensive evaluation suite involving 2,323 natural, challenging, and diverse charts from scientific papers. CharXiv includes two types of questions: 1) descriptive questions about examining basic chart elements and 2) reasoning questions that require synthesizing information across complex visual elements in the chart. To ensure quality, all charts and questions are handpicked, curated, and verified by human experts. Our results reveal a substantial, previously underestimated gap between the reasoning skills of the strongest proprietary model (i.e., GPT-4o), which achieves 47.1% accuracy, and the strongest open-source model (i.e., InternVL Chat V1.5), which achieves 29.2%. All models lag far behind human performance of 80.5%, underscoring weaknesses in the chart understanding capabilities of existing MLLMs. We hope that CharXiv facilitates future research on MLLM chart understanding by providing a more realistic and faithful measure of progress. Project website: https://charxiv.github.io/ Mengzhou Xia, Luxi He, Howard Chen 0003, Yitao Liu, Richard Zhu, Kaiqu Liang, Xindi Wu, Sadhika Malladi, Alexis Chevalier, Sanjeev Arora, Danqi Chen 0001 |
NeurIPS | 3 |
| 2023 | Aleatoric and Epistemic Discrimination: Fundamental Limits of Fairness InterventionsabstractMachine learning (ML) models can underperform on certain population groups due to choices made during model development and bias inherent in the data. We categorize sources of discrimination in the ML pipeline into two classes: aleatoric discrimination, which is inherent in the data distribution, and epistemic discrimination, which is due to decisions made during model development. We quantify aleatoric discrimination by determining the performance limits of a model under fairness constraints, assuming perfect knowledge of the data distribution. We demonstrate how to characterize aleatoric discrimination by applying Blackwell's results on comparing statistical experiments. We then quantify epistemic discrimination as the gap between a model's accuracy when fairness constraints are applied and the limit posed by aleatoric discrimination. We apply this approach to benchmark existing fairness interventions and investigate fairness risks in data with missing values. Our results indicate that state-of-the-art fairness interventions are effective at removing epistemic discrimination on standard (overused) tabular datasets. However, when data has missing values, there is still significant room for improvement in handling aleatoric discrimination. Hao Wang 0063, Luxi He, Rui Gao 0001, Flávio P. Calmon |
NeurIPS | 2 |