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Michael Ruberry

dblp:34/8821 · also Mike Ruberry · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2013
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2Theory of computation · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 91% Mathematical optimization · 9%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › prediction markets
market scoring rules
0.212013
Cost function market makers for measurable spaces · EC 2013
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
prediction markets
0.212013
Cost function market makers for measurable spaces · EC 2013
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › social choice › voting
scoring rules
0.212013
Cost function market makers for measurable spaces · EC 2013
Mathematical optimization › continuous optimization › convex optimization
convex duality
0.012013
Cost function market makers for measurable spaces · EC 2013

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

subdifferential analysis · 0.2convex duality · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2013 Cost function market makers for measurable spaces
abstract
We characterize cost function market makers designed to elicit traders' beliefs about the expectations of an infinite set of random variables or the full distribution of a continuous random variable. This characterization is derived from a duality perspective that associates the market maker's liabilities with market beliefs, generalizing the framework of [11,13], but relies on a new subdifferential analysis. It differs from prior approaches in that it allows arbitrary market beliefs, not just those that admit density functions. This allows us to overcome the impossibility results of [10] and design the first automated market maker for betting on the realization of a continuous random variable taking values in {0,1} that has bounded loss without resorting to discretization. Additionally, we show that scoring rules are derived from the same duality and share a close connection with cost functions for eliciting beliefs.
Yiling Chen 0001, Michael Ruberry, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
EC2
2012 Designing Informative Securities
Yiling Chen 0001, Michael Ruberry, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
UAI2