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Jacob Ginesin

dblp:343/2871 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
2as first author
4since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Security and privacy of machine learning · 33% Systems and software security · 33% Network security · 25%
Computer networks
1 paper
Transport protocols and congestion control · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning
AI agent security
1.012026
SAGA: A Security Architecture for Governing AI Agentic Systems · NDSS 2026
Systems and software security › secure system design
security architecture
1.012026
SAGA: A Security Architecture for Governing AI Agentic Systems · NDSS 2026
Network security
protocol security
0.812024
A Formal Analysis of SCTP: Attack Synthesis and Patch Verification · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Authentication and access control
authorization
0.312026
SAGA: A Security Architecture for Governing AI Agentic Systems · NDSS 2026
Transport protocols and congestion control
transport protocols
0.212024
A Formal Analysis of SCTP: Attack Synthesis and Patch Verification · USENIX Security Symposium 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

formal analysis · 1.5attack synthesis · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 CommILP: Synthesizing Communication Infrastructure for Domain Computing Platforms
abstract
Domain-specific accelerator-rich platforms are promising for high-throughput, low-power edge systems. Prior domain design-space exploration (Domain-DSE) methods [1] efficiently allocate processing elements (PEs) and bind applications, but largely assume simplified, centralized communication within the hardware tile, which limits scalability and wastes resources. Novel research work is needed that takes advantage of designtime known communication patterns to synthesize custom intratile interconnects that minimize area and energy while preserving application throughput. This paper introduces CommILP for synthesizing intra-tile communication infrastructure given a platform allocation and PE-to-PE communication graphs for multiple applications. CommILP instantiates Communication Elements (CEs), determines a minimal interconnect topology, and assigns routing paths for each app and connection. It guarantees that application throughput is preserved while minimizing area and energy. CommILP introduces a hierarchical ILP formulation across platform, application, and hop-stack levels, and supports both App-Level and Domain-Aggregated modeling modes to balance solution quality and runtime. Evaluated on ASIC and FPGA backends using both real (OpenVX-40) and synthetic (RNDComm-100) domains, CommILP achieves up to 69.4% area and 73% energy savings over centralized baselines, while remaining scalable to over 100 applications. It complements existing platform DSE tools by bridging the gap between computation binding and hardware-efficient communication synthesis.
Qucheng Jiang, Jacob Ginesin, Oscar Kellner, Tianrui Ma, Gunar Schirner
ASP-DAC2
2026 SAGA: A Security Architecture for Governing AI Agentic Systems
Georgios Syros, Anshuman Suri, Jacob Ginesin, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, Alina Oprea
NDSS3
2024 A Formal Analysis of SCTP: Attack Synthesis and Patch Verification
Jacob Ginesin, Max von Hippel, Evan Defloor, Cristina Nita-Rotaru, Michael Tüxen
USENIX Security Symposium1
2022 Understanding DNS Query Composition at B-Root
abstract
The Domain Name System (DNS) is part of critical internet infrastructure, as DNS is invoked whenever a remote server is accessed (an URL is visited, an API request is made, etc.) by any application. DNS queries are served in hierarchical manner, with most queries served locally from cached data, and a small fraction propagating to the top of the hierarchy – DNS root name servers. Our research aims to provide a comprehensive, longitudinal characterization of DNS queries received at B-Root over ten years. We sampled and analyzed a 28-billion-query large dataset from the ten annual "Day in the Life of the Internet (DITL)" experiments, from 2013 through 2022. We sought to identify and quantify unexpected DNS queries, establish longitudinal trends, and compare our findings with published results of others. We found that unexpected query traffic increased from 39.57% in 2013 to 67.91% in 2022, with 36.55% of queries being priming queries. We also observed growth and decline of Chromium-initiated, random DNS queries. Finally, we analyzed the largest DNS query senders and established that most of their traffic consists of unexpected queries.
Jacob Ginesin, Jelena Mirkovic
BDCAT1