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Guiyun Qin

dblp:343/8507 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
2as first author
4since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · conflict

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 since 2021Computer networks · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Privacy and data protection · 61% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 39%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Privacy and data protection › privacy-preserving query processing
encrypted query processing
1.012026
Can I Get More? An Incremental Inference Attack on Encrypted SQL · SP 2026
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
searchable encryption
1.012026
A Searchable Encryption With System-Wide Forward and Backward Security Supporting Boolean Query · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › searchable encryption
forward and backward privacy
0.312026
A Searchable Encryption With System-Wide Forward and Backward Security Supporting Boolean Query · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

symmetric encryption · 1.0inference attack · 1.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Can I Get More? An Incremental Inference Attack on Encrypted SQL
Xiaoqian Sun, Ruiqi He, Siyi Lv, Guiyun Qin, Fangzhou Yi, Zheli Liu, Xiaofeng Chen 0001
SP5
2026 A Searchable Encryption With System-Wide Forward and Backward Security Supporting Boolean Query
Guiyun Qin, Xiaoqian Sun, Fangzhou Yi, Siyi Lv, Xiaoxin Du, Zheli Liu, Xiaofeng Chen 0001
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.1
2024 Controlled Search: Building Inverted-Index PEKS With Less Leakage in Multiuser Setting
abstract
The public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) schemes are mostly applied to small data sets in mail forwarding systems. When retrieving large databases, the typical search mechanism makes them inefficient and impractical. When designing a PEKS scheme, except for remedying the vulnerability of keyword guessing attacks (KGAs), other leakage issues, such as multipattern privacy and forward/backward security are rarely considered, which may lead to information leakage. Moreover, most existing PEKS only consider applications in single-user scenarios, and cannot be directly transferred to multiuser scenarios, which undermines the value of data utilization. To cope with the above concerns, we propose a PEKS scheme based on an inverted index where the bitmap is used to build the index for the first time in PEKS to meet some seemingly conflicting yet desirable characteristics. First, it has high search efficiency under multiwriter and multiuser. Through linear transformation, users quickly retrieve data and control other users’ access to their data without relying on a third party for authentication. Second, we prove its security in an enhanced security model that achieves multipattern privacy and forward and backward security. It can also resist KGA attacks without a designated tester, which makes it more practical. Finally, it can be extended to achieve search result verification. Compare to the scheme (Zhang et al. ICWS 2016), it has absolute advantages in security and computational cost where the search efficiency is improved by two orders of magnitude.
Guiyun Qin, Pengtao Liu, Chengyu Hu 0001, Zengpeng Li 0001, Shanqing Guo
IEEE Internet Things J.1
2022 Secure and Efficient Cloud Ciphertext Deduplication Based on SGX
abstract
With the development of data outsourcing technology, the data stored by cloud storage servers are exploding. Secure deduplication for encrypted data helps cloud servers reduce storage overhead in the scenario that cloud users outsource their data in ciphertext. To satisfy client-side semantic security, most existing deduplication schemes for encrypted data need trusted third parties. However, trusted third parties are difficult to deploy and may cause potential risks. Therefore, we propose a secure cloud ciphertext deduplication scheme based on Intel SGX. The proposed scheme uses the Enclave security container provided by Intel SGX as the trusted execution environment on the cloud server to replace the trusted third party to perform sensitive operations. At the same time, our scheme simplifies the secure management of the file encryption keys so that the encryption key of the files with the same data can be securely distributed to other owners of the same file without the need for the original uploader online. We prove the security of the proposed scheme and the experiment shows the efficiency of the scheme.
Guiyun Qin, Pengtao Liu, Chengyu Hu 0001, Shanqing Guo
ICPADS2