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Shumei Yuan

dblp:343/9436 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Trustworthy machine learning · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack
0.912025
Stealthy and Effective Clean-Label Backdoor Attack via Adaptive Frequency-Domain Suppression and Trigger Combination · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack › backdoor poisoning attacks
clean-label backdoor attack
0.912025
Stealthy and Effective Clean-Label Backdoor Attack via Adaptive Frequency-Domain Suppression and Trigger Combination · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack
trigger design
0.912025
Stealthy and Effective Clean-Label Backdoor Attack via Adaptive Frequency-Domain Suppression and Trigger Combination · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial robustness
0.312025
Stealthy and Effective Clean-Label Backdoor Attack via Adaptive Frequency-Domain Suppression and Trigger Combination · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
backdoor defense
0.312025
Stealthy and Effective Clean-Label Backdoor Attack via Adaptive Frequency-Domain Suppression and Trigger Combination · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

surrogate model · 1.7frequency-domain suppression · 1.7affine trigger combination · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Stealthy and Effective Clean-Label Backdoor Attack via Adaptive Frequency-Domain Suppression and Trigger Combination
abstract
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) remain vulnerable to backdoor attacks. These attacks are pernicious when attackers inject a trigger into the input data without altering its ground-truth label, known as clean-label backdoor attacks. The effectiveness and stealth of existing clean-label backdoor attacks rely on access to global training data, making them resource-intensive and impractical. This paper introduces a novel clean-label backdoor attack that achieves high attack success rates (ASR) while maintaining exceptional stealth under realistic constraints. Unlike prior approaches focused on spatial differences between clean and poisoned data, a key novelty of the new attack is the suppression of high-frequency components in the frequency domain, which minimizes human-detectable contrasts and enhances trigger imperceptibility. Moreover, we employ an affine combination of static and adaptive triggers, effectively balancing their strengths to maximize ASR. Surrogate models are designed to simulate victim model behavior and auxiliary models are applied to extract the spatial and frequency features of the static triggers, enabling trigger design with minimal knowledge of the victim model. Our attack achieves a higher ASR than state-of-the-art backdoor attacks while maintaining higher benign accuracy across various models and datasets. It also demonstrates strong resistance against the latest defense mechanisms, including STRIP, SentiNet, neural cleanse, fine-pruning, and ANP.
Chaoying Yuan, Jingpeng Bai, Shumei Yuan, Wei Ni 0001
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.3