Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Wenjie Mo 0001
dblp:344/2097 · also Wenjie Jacky Mo
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
3since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 1 first-author · 3 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
2 papers |
Vision and language · 70% Trustworthy machine learning · 23% Segmentation and scene understanding · 7% | |
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Program synthesis and code generation · 100% |
Topics — the 9 heaviest of 9, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Security and privacy of machine learning
red teaming |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | RedCoder: Automated Multi-Turn Red Teaming for Code LLMs · ACL (1) 2026 |
Computer vision › Vision and language › multimodal understanding
multi-image understanding |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | MuirBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Robust Multi-image Understanding · ICLR 2025 |
Computer vision › Vision and language
multimodal evaluation |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | MuirBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Robust Multi-image Understanding · ICLR 2025 |
Computer vision › Vision and language › vision-language model
multimodal large language model |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | MuirBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Robust Multi-image Understanding · ICLR 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Rethinking Backdoor Detection Evaluation for Language Models · EMNLP 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Rethinking Backdoor Detection Evaluation for Language Models · EMNLP 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack › backdoor defense
backdoor detection |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Rethinking Backdoor Detection Evaluation for Language Models · EMNLP 2025 |
Program synthesis and code generation
code generation with language models |
0.3 | 1 | 2026 | RedCoder: Automated Multi-Turn Red Teaming for Code LLMs · ACL (1) 2026 |
Computer vision › Segmentation and scene understanding
scene understanding |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | MuirBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Robust Multi-image Understanding · ICLR 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
automated attack generation · 2.0trigger inversion · 1.7meta-classifier · 1.7multi-turn red-teaming · 1.0multi-turn red teaming · 1.0multiple-choice evaluation · 0.9benchmarking · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | RedCoder: Automated Multi-Turn Red Teaming for Code LLMsabstractWenjie Jacky Mo, Qin Liu, Xiaofei Wen, Dongwon Jung, Hadi Askari, Wenxuan Zhou, Zhe Zhao, Muhao Chen. Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2026. Wenjie Mo 0001, Qin Liu 0010, Xiaofei Wen, Dongwon Jung, Hadi Askari, Wenxuan Zhou 0002, Muhao Chen 0001 |
ACL (1) | 1 |
| 2025 | Rethinking Backdoor Detection Evaluation for Language ModelsabstractBackdoor attacks, in which a model behaves maliciously when given an attacker-specified trigger, pose a major security risk for practitioners who depend on publicly released language models.As a countermeasure, backdoor detection methods aim to detect whether a released model contains a backdoor.While existing backdoor detection methods have high accuracy in detecting backdoored models on standard benchmarks, it is unclear whether they can robustly identify backdoors in the wild.In this paper, we examine the robustness of backdoor detectors by manipulating different factors during backdoor planting.We find that the success of existing methods based on trigger inversion or meta classifiers highly depends on how intensely the model is trained on poisoned data.Specifically, backdoors planted with more aggressive or more conservative training are significantly more difficult to detect than the default ones.Our results highlight a lack of robustness of existing backdoor detectors and the limitations in current benchmark construction. Jun Yan 0012, Wenjie Mo 0001, Xiang Ren 0001, Robin Jia |
EMNLP | 2 |
| 2025 | MuirBench: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Robust Multi-image UnderstandingabstractWe introduce MuirBench, a comprehensive benchmark that focuses on robust multi-image understanding capabilities of multimodal LLMs. MuirBench consists of 12 diverse multi-image tasks (e.g., scene understanding, ordering) that involve 10 categories of multi-image relations (e.g., multiview, temporal relations). Comprising 11,264 images and 2,600 multiple-choice questions, MuirBench is created in a pairwise manner, where each standard instance is paired with an unanswerable variant that has minimal semantic differences, in order for a reliable assessment. Evaluated upon 20 recent multi-modal LLMs, our results reveal that even the best-performing models like GPT-4o and Gemini Pro find it challenging to solve MuirBench, achieving 68.0% and 49.3% in accuracy. Open-source multimodal LLMs trained on single images can hardly generalize to multi-image questions, hovering below 33.3% in accuracy. These results highlight the importance of MuirBench in encouraging the community to develop multimodal LLMs that can look beyond a single image, suggesting potential pathways for future improvements. Fei Wang 0060, James Y. Huang, Zekun Li 0007, Qin Liu 0010, Xiaogeng Liu, Mingyu Derek Ma, Nan Xu 0014, Wenxuan Zhou 0002, Kai Zhang 0008, Tianyi Lorena Yan, Wenjie Mo 0001, Hsiang-Hui Liu, Pan Lu, Chunyuan Li, Chaowei Xiao, Kai-Wei Chang 0001, Dan Roth 0001, Sheng Zhang 0012, Hoifung Poon, Muhao Chen 0001 |
ICLR | 12 |