The exchange of information for attention is an increasingly important transaction in modern economies. Online and offline, information is offered to attract attention and to be consulted as many times as possible.

Society is constantly presented with opportunities to adopt new technologies, from groundbreaking medical treatments to innovative devices and software. Early stages of new technologies carry significant uncertainty about quality or viability. This uncertainty is reduced only as agents start adopting and experiencing the new technology. However, the information generated by early adopters only benefits those who make decisions later, so that agents adopt at a slower pace than socially optimal, delaying potential benefits to society.

Inspections are frequently conducted to reveal information about agents' otherwise unobserved actions. Some inspections occur at pre-announced times; others are surprises. We show how the productive role of the inspected agent determines whether predictable or random inspections are optimal. If the agent's main task is achieving a breakthrough---think of an entrepreneur investing in an innovative industry---then predictable inspections are optimal. If the main task is avoiding a breakdown---think of a financial institution managing its risk in order to avoid default---then random inspections are optimal.