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Rémi Coudert

dblp:345/6548 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2023
0000-0002-4784-568XORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 1 · 1 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Web and mobile security · 44% Systems and software security · 44% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 13%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
checksum verification
0.712023
An Empirical Study of the Usage of Checksums for Web Downloads · WWW 2023
Web and mobile security
web security
0.712023
An Empirical Study of the Usage of Checksums for Web Downloads · WWW 2023
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
hash functions
0.212023
An Empirical Study of the Usage of Checksums for Web Downloads · WWW 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

snowball sampling · 0.7active learning · 0.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 An Empirical Study of the Usage of Checksums for Web Downloads
abstract
Checksums, typically provided on webpages and generated from cryptographic hash functions (e.g., MD5, SHA256) or signature schemes (e.g., PGP), are commonly used on websites to enable users to verify that the files they download have not been tampered with when stored on possibly untrusted servers. In this paper, we elucidate the current practices regarding the usage of checksums for web downloads (hash functions used, visibility and validity of checksums, type of websites and files, etc.), as this has been mostly overlooked so far. Using a snowball-sampling strategy for the 200000 most popular domains of the Web, we first crawled a dataset of 8.5M webpages, from which we built, through an active-learning approach, a unique dataset of 277 diverse webpages that contain checksums. Our analysis of these webpages reveals interesting findings about the usage of checksums. For instance, it shows that checksums are used mostly to verify program files, that weak hash functions are frequently used, and that a non-negligible proportion of the checksums provided on webpages do not match that of their associated files. Finally, we complement our analysis with a survey of the webmasters of the considered webpages (N = 26), thus shedding light on the reasons behind the checksum-related choices they make.
Gaël Bernard, Rémi Coudert, Bertil Chapuis, Kévin Huguenin
WWW2