Many modern devices, including critical infrastructure, depend on the reliable operation of electrical power conversion systems. The small size and versatility of switched-mode power converters has led to their widespread use. While transformer-based systems passively convert voltage, switched-mode power converters have an actively controlled feedback loop that relies on accurate sensor measurements. Previous academic work has shown that many types of sensors are vulnerable to Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) attacks, and it has been speculated that power converters are also susceptible.In this paper, we present the first detailed and practical evaluation of IEMI attacks against switched-mode power converters as a whole by manipulating the voltage and current sensors in their feedback loops. We develop a novel multi-frequency IEMI attack technique to effectively target devices with multiple sensors. We experimentally validate our theoretical predictions by analyzing multiple AC-DC and DC-DC converters, automotive-grade current sensors, dedicated battery chargers, and a real-world electric vehicle charger. Our attack is reliably effective at overcharging and permanently damaging Li-ion cells, and causing the EV charger to output 50 V more than it reports.

Satellite communications are increasingly crucial for telecommunications, navigation, and Earth observation. However, many widely used satellites do not cryptographically secure the downlink, opening the door for radio spoofing attacks. Recent developments in software-defined radio hardware have enabled attacks on wireless systems including GNSS, which can be effectively spoofed using only cheap hardware available off the shelf. However, these conclusions do not generalize well to other satellite systems such as high data rate backhauls or satellite-to-customer connections, where the spoofing requirements are currently unknown. In this paper, we present a systematic review of spoofing attacks against satellite downlink communications systems. We establish a threat model linking attack feasibility and impact to required budget through real-world experiments and channel simulations. Our results show that nearly all evaluated satellite systems were overshadowable at a distance of 1 km in the worst case, for a budget of ~2000 USD or less. We evaluate how key challenges surrounding modulation schemes, antenna directionality, and legitimate satellite signal strength can be overcome in practice through antenna sidelobe targeting, overshadowing, and automatic gain control takeover. We also show that, surprisingly, protocols designed to be more robust against channel noise are significantly less robust against an overshadowing attacker. We conclude with a discussion of physical-layer countermeasures specifically applicable to satellite systems which can not be cryptographically upgraded.