Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are a popular method for interpreting concepts represented in large language model (LLM) activations. However, there is a lack of evidence regarding the validity of their interpretations due to the lack of a ground truth for the concepts used by an LLM, and a growing number of works have presented problems with current SAEs. One alternative source of evidence would be demonstrating that SAEs improve performance on downstream tasks beyond existing baselines. We test this by applying SAEs to the real-world task of LLM activation probing in four regimes: data scarcity, class imbalance, label noise, and covariate shift. Due to the difficulty of detecting concepts in these challenging settings, we hypothesize that SAEs’ basis of interpretable, concept-level latents should provide a useful inductive bias. However, although SAEs occasionally perform better than baselines on individual datasets, we are unable to design ensemble methods combining SAEs with baselines that consistently outperform ensemble methods solely using baselines. Additionally, although SAEs initially appear promising for identifying spurious correlations, detecting poor dataset quality, and training multi-token probes, we are able to achieve similar results with simple non-SAE baselines as well. Though we cannot discount SAEs’ utility on other tasks, our findings highlight the shortcomings of current SAEs and the need to rigorously evaluate interpretability methods on downstream tasks with strong baselines.

Scalable oversight, the process by which weaker AI systems supervise stronger ones, has been proposed as a key strategy to control future superintelligent systems. However, it is still unclear how scalable oversight itself scales. To address this gap, we propose a framework that quantifies the probability of successful oversight as a function of the capabilities of the overseer and the system being overseen. Specifically, our framework models oversight as a game between capability-mismatched players; the players have oversight-specific Elo scores that are a piecewise-linear function of their general intelligence, with two plateaus corresponding to task incompetence and task saturation. We validate our framework with a modified version of the game Nim and then apply it to four oversight games: Mafia, Debate, Backdoor Code and Wargames. For each game, we find scaling laws that approximate how domain performance depends on general AI system capability. We then build on our findings in a theoretical study of Nested Scalable Oversight (NSO), a process in which trusted models oversee untrusted stronger models, which then become the trusted models in the next step. We identify conditions under which NSO succeeds and derive numerically (and in some cases analytically) the optimal number of oversight levels to maximize the probability of oversight success. We also apply our theory to our four oversight games, where we find that NSO success rates at a general Elo gap of 400 are 13.5\% for Mafia, 51.7\% for Debate, 10.0\% for Backdoor Code, and 9.4\% for Wargames; these rates decline further when overseeing stronger systems.