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Boshi Zheng

dblp:349/7015 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Trustworthy machine learning · 96% Deep learning architectures and training · 4%

Topics — the 8 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial attack
1.012026
Manipulating the Mind's Eye: A-SAGE, the Attention-Based Attack on ViT Explainability · AAAI 2026
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › interpretability › mechanistic interpretability
attention intervention
1.012026
Manipulating the Mind's Eye: A-SAGE, the Attention-Based Attack on ViT Explainability · AAAI 2026
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › interpretability › explanation evaluation
explanation robustness
1.012026
Manipulating the Mind's Eye: A-SAGE, the Attention-Based Attack on ViT Explainability · AAAI 2026
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
interpretability
1.012026
Manipulating the Mind's Eye: A-SAGE, the Attention-Based Attack on ViT Explainability · AAAI 2026
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness
1.012026
Manipulating the Mind's Eye: A-SAGE, the Attention-Based Attack on ViT Explainability · AAAI 2026
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › adversarial attack
transfer attack
1.012026
Manipulating the Mind's Eye: A-SAGE, the Attention-Based Attack on ViT Explainability · AAAI 2026
Machine learning › Deep learning architectures and training › transformer
vision transformer
0.312026
Manipulating the Mind's Eye: A-SAGE, the Attention-Based Attack on ViT Explainability · AAAI 2026
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › interpretability › neural network interpretation
vision transformer explainability
0.312026
Manipulating the Mind's Eye: A-SAGE, the Attention-Based Attack on ViT Explainability · AAAI 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

attention map distortion loss · 1.0attention entropy loss · 1.0adversarial example generation · 1.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Manipulating the Mind's Eye: A-SAGE, the Attention-Based Attack on ViT Explainability
abstract
The rise of Vision Transformers (ViTs) as cornerstone models in safety-critical applications like autonomous driving and medical diagnosis has shifted the focus from pure accuracy to verifiable trustworthiness. However, the very mechanisms used to explain these models, their internal attention maps, are themselves vulnerable. This creates a critical "trust gap," as the model's apparent reasoning can be maliciously manipulated. To systematically investigate this vulnerability, we introduce A-SAGE (Attention-based Steering Adversarial Generation by Corrupting Explanations), a dual-objective attack framework that forces a model to misclassify an input while simultaneously corrupting its internal attention patterns to generate a misleading explanation. A-SAGE achieves this by optimizing a unified loss that combines a standard classification objective with two explanation-specific terms: an attention entropy loss to diffuse the model's focus and an attention map distortion loss to steer the corrupted explanation towards a desired target. Our primary finding is A-SAGE's exceptional black-box transferability. Using a CaiT-S as a white-box surrogate, adversarial examples generated with imperceptible perturbations achieve attack success rates of 79.4% on ViT-B, 49.7% on ResNet-50, and over 81.5% on other transformers (DeiT-B,TNT-S). Crucially, these successful attacks do not merely destroy the explanation; they generate a coherent but false attention map that deceptively "justifies" the wrong prediction. These results reveal a systemic vulnerability in the core reasoning of modern foundation models, establishing A-SAGE as a critical benchmark for auditing the robustness of AI explainability.
Boshi Zheng, Yan Li 0035
AAAI1