Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Sangyoon Yu
dblp:350/3784
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 3 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
3 papers |
Trustworthy machine learning · 40% Efficient and distributed learning · 26% Language models and text generation · 17% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 88% Systems and software security · 12% |
Topics — the 10 heaviest of 11, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model safety |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | One-Shot is Enough: Consolidating Multi-Turn Attacks into Efficient Single-Turn Prompts for LLMs · ACL (1) 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
safety evaluation |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | ELITE: Enhanced Language-Image Toxicity Evaluation for Safety · ICML 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › AI safety › content safety
toxicity analysis |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | ELITE: Enhanced Language-Image Toxicity Evaluation for Safety · ICML 2025 |
Computer vision › Vision and language
vision-language model |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | ELITE: Enhanced Language-Image Toxicity Evaluation for Safety · ICML 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | One-Shot is Enough: Consolidating Multi-Turn Attacks into Efficient Single-Turn Prompts for LLMs · ACL (1) 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › jailbreak attack
jailbreak prompts |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | One-Shot is Enough: Consolidating Multi-Turn Attacks into Efficient Single-Turn Prompts for LLMs · ACL (1) 2025 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
federated learning |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | DepthFL : Depthwise Federated Learning for Heterogeneous Clients · ICLR 2023 |
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning
model compression |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | DepthFL : Depthwise Federated Learning for Heterogeneous Clients · ICLR 2023 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
red teaming |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | One-Shot is Enough: Consolidating Multi-Turn Attacks into Efficient Single-Turn Prompts for LLMs · ACL (1) 2025 |
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | One-Shot is Enough: Consolidating Multi-Turn Attacks into Efficient Single-Turn Prompts for LLMs · ACL (1) 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
prompt reformatting · 1.7multi-turn to single-turn conversion · 1.7toxicity scoring · 0.9automated evaluation · 0.9self-distillation · 0.7knowledge distillation · 0.7depthwise partitioning · 0.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | One-Shot is Enough: Consolidating Multi-Turn Attacks into Efficient Single-Turn Prompts for LLMsabstractWe introduce a novel framework for consolidating multi-turn adversarial ``jailbreak'' prompts into single-turn queries, significantly reducing the manual overhead required for adversarial testing of large language models (LLMs). While multi-turn human jailbreaks have been shown to yield high attack success rates, they demand considerable human effort and time. Our multi-turn-to-single-turn (M2S) methods -- Hyphenize, Numberize, and Pythonize -- systematically reformat multi-turn dialogues into structured single-turn prompts. Despite removing iterative back-and-forth interactions, these prompts preserve and often enhance adversarial potency: in extensive evaluations on the Multi-turn Human Jailbreak (MHJ) dataset, M2S methods achieve attack success rates from 70.6 percent to 95.9 percent across several state-of-the-art LLMs. Remarkably, the single-turn prompts outperform the original multi-turn attacks by as much as 17.5 percentage points while cutting token usage by more than half on average. Further analysis shows that embedding malicious requests in enumerated or code-like structures exploits ``contextual blindness'', bypassing both native guardrails and external input-output filters. By converting multi-turn conversations into concise single-turn prompts, the M2S framework provides a scalable tool for large-scale red teaming and reveals critical weaknesses in contemporary LLM defenses. Junwoo Ha, Sangyoon Yu, Haon Park, Ashkan Yousefpour, Yuna Park, Suhyun Kim 0001 |
ACL (1) | 3 |
| 2025 | ELITE: Enhanced Language-Image Toxicity Evaluation for SafetyabstractCurrent Vision Language Models (VLMs) remain vulnerable to malicious prompts that induce harmful outputs. Existing safety benchmarks for VLMs primarily rely on automated evaluation methods, but these methods struggle to detect implicit harmful content or produce inaccurate evaluations. Therefore, we found that existing benchmarks have low levels of harmfulness, ambiguous data, and limited diversity in image-text pair combinations. To address these issues, we propose the ELITE benchmark, a high-quality safety evaluation benchmark for VLMs, underpinned by our enhanced evaluation method, the ELITE evaluator. The ELITE evaluator explicitly incorporates a toxicity score to accurately assess harmfulness in multimodal contexts, where VLMs often provide specific, convincing, but unharmful descriptions of images. We filter out ambiguous and low-quality image-text pairs from existing benchmarks using the ELITE evaluator and generate diverse combinations of safe and unsafe image-text pairs. Our experiments demonstrate that the ELITE evaluator achieves superior alignment with human evaluations compared to prior automated methods, and the ELITE benchmark offers enhanced benchmark quality and diversity. By introducing ELITE, we pave the way for safer, more robust VLMs, contributing essential tools for evaluating and mitigating safety risks in real-world applications. Doehyeon Lee, Eugene Choi, Sangyoon Yu, Ashkan Yousefpour, Haon Park, Bumsub Ham, Suhyun Kim 0001 |
ICML | 4 |
| 2023 | DepthFL : Depthwise Federated Learning for Heterogeneous Clients
Sangyoon Yu, Suhyun Kim 0001, Soo-Mook Moon |
ICLR | 2 |