Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has garnered significant attention across various communities, particularly with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) advancing to the fourth round of PQC standardization. One of the leading candidates is Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC), which received a significant update on February 23, 2024. This update, which introduces a classical dense-dense multiplication approach, has no known dedicated hardware implementations yet. The innovative Core-V eXtension InterFace (CV-X-IF) is a communication interface for RISC-V processors that significantly facilitates the integration of new instructions to the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA), through tightly connected accelerators. In this paper, we present a TightlY-coupled accelerator for RISC-V for Code-based cryptogrAphy (TYRCA), proposing the first fully tightly-coupled hardware implementation of the HQC-PQC algorithm, leveraging the CV-X-IF. The proposed architecture is implemented on the Xilinx Kintex-7 FPGA. Experimental results demonstrate that TYRCA reduces the execution time by 94% to 96% for HQC-128, HQC-192, and HQC-256, showcasing its potential for efficient HQC code-based cryptography.

This paper presents the design and implementation of a RISC-V-based Keccak co-processor optimized for Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms. Leveraging the Core-V eXtension InterFace (CV-X-IF), the co-processor extends the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) with three custom instructions tailored for cryptographic operations. This allows seamless integration into various PQC schemes, tested across the multiple standards proposed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), including CRYSTALS-Kyber, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, SPHINCS+, and FALCON, which are designed to withstand quantum attacks. By employing tightly coupled hardware acceleration, the Keccak co-processor dramatically reduces the computational overhead of hash-based operations central to these algorithms. The implementation is realized on a Xilinx Artix 7 FPGA, achieving a clock cycles’ improvement up to 75% and 19% resource overhead. The results presented herein demonstrate significant performance enhancement over the state of the art, underscoring its effectiveness for cryptographic applications.

Modern RISC-V designs are increasingly integrating cryptographic accelerators to provide better security features while enhancing performance; however, their vulnerability to power side-channel attacks remains insufficiently investigated. This paper presents a comprehensive evaluation of such vulnerabilities in a RISCV-based AES accelerator connected via the Core-V eXtension Interface (CV-X-IF). The analysis begins at the RTL using simulated power traces, employing KL (Kullback–Leibler) divergence alongside established statistical attacks such as Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Although the former serves as an early indicator of potential leakage, simulation results highlight its limitations compared to CPA and DPA. To validate these findings, leakage trends are further examined through FPGA-based power measurement. The proposed methodology is designed to be broadly applicable to a range of cryptographic workloads and accelerator architectures. It is demonstrated on an AES accelerator implementing the scalar cryptographic extension (Zk) with pre-expanded keys. Our findings reveal that side-channel vulnerabilities can persist even in tightly integrated instruction pipelines, underscoring the importance of early-stage leakage assessment. Notably, the close alignment between RTL-level simulations and FPGA-based measurements highlights the effectiveness of the approach and its practical value for guiding secure hardware design in RISC-V ecosystems. In particular, AES serves only as a case of study; the proposed RTL and FPGA validation flow is generic and can be applied to any cryptographic accelerator.

One of the key metrics used for defying the security of the Internet of Things (IoT) is data integrity, which mostly relies on the use of cryptographic hash functions. In the last years, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced SHA-3 as the new standard for better security. SHA-3 is also exploited in most of the current post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) protocols. Nevertheless, the used algorithm, i.e. Keccak, is computationally heavy and consequently limits its utilization in RISC-V-based Systems on Chip (SoC). In this work, a Keccak accelerator is proposed to speed up SHA3 computations for the CRYSTALS-Kyber algorithm on the RISCV-based advanced microcontroller PULPissimo. Compared to the plain SW implementation on RISC-V, our results show a speedup factor of up to 2.79 at the expense of a 12.4% resources overhead.