EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Lea Nagel
dblp:351/1650
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
0009-0005-6792-7200ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Theory of computation · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
2 papers |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › incentive compatibility
dominant strategy incentive compatibility |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | As-if Dominant Strategy Mechanisms · EC 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › information design
information disclosure |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | As-if Dominant Strategy Mechanisms · EC 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › game solving
strategy complexity |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | A Measure of Complexity for Strategy-Proof Mechanisms · EC 2023 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
truthful mechanism |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | A Measure of Complexity for Strategy-Proof Mechanisms · EC 2023 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
theoretical framework for mechanism design · 0.8complexity measure characterization · 0.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | As-if Dominant Strategy MechanismsabstractGrowing evidence suggests that breaking dominant strategy incentive compatibility in favor of increasing a mechanism's transparency---i.e., allowing agents to observe more about others' past moves---may sometimes achieve closer conformity to the designer's objective. To help increase the practical efficacy of mechanism design, in this paper we provide a theoretical framework to predict in advance when this is the case. Lea Nagel, Roberto Saitto |
EC | 1 |
| 2023 | A Measure of Complexity for Strategy-Proof MechanismsabstractWe propose a measure of strategic complexity for strategy-proof mechanisms. In particular, we characterize a class of implementations for which we provide a complete ranking in terms of their strategic complexity, in a well-defined sense. The class---which we call essential frames---includes virtually all strategy-proof mechanisms used in practice. Lea Nagel, Roberto Saitto |
EC | 1 |