EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Suyu An
dblp:352/2893
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Trustworthy machine learning · 100% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% | |
| Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper |
Machine learning and data management · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › privacy
privacy evaluation |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Comparing Different Membership Inference Attacks With a Comprehensive Benchmark · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
membership inference |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Comparing Different Membership Inference Attacks With a Comprehensive Benchmark · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025 |
Machine learning and data management
model evaluation |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Comparing Different Membership Inference Attacks With a Comprehensive Benchmark · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
membership inference · 2.6benchmarking · 2.6
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Comparing Different Membership Inference Attacks With a Comprehensive BenchmarkabstractMembership inference (MI) attacks pose a significant threat to user privacy in machine learning systems. While numerous attack mechanisms have been proposed in the literature, the lack of standardized evaluation parameters and metrics has led to inconsistent and even conflicting comparison results. To address this issue and facilitate a systematic analysis of these disparate findings, we introduce MIBench, a comprehensive benchmark that includes a suite of carefully designed evaluation scenarios (ESs) and evaluation metrics to provide a consistent framework for assessing the efficacy of various MI techniques. The ESs are crafted to encompass four critical factors: intra-dataset distance distribution, inter-sample distance within the target dataset, differential distance analysis, and inference withholding ratio. In total, MIBench includes ten typical evaluation metrics and incorporates 84 distinct ESs for each dataset. Using MIBench, we conducted a thorough comparative analysis of 15 state-of-the-art MI attacks across 588 ESs, seven widely adopted datasets, and seven representative model architectures. Our analysis revealed 83 instances of Conflicting Comparison Results (CCR), providing substantial evidence for the CCR Phenomenon. We identified two CCR types: Type 1 (single-factor) and Type 2 (dual-factor). The distribution of CCR instances across the four critical factors was: inter-sample distance (40.96%), differential distance (37.35%), inference withholding ratio (19.28%), and intra-dataset distance (2.41%). All MIBench codes and evaluations are available athttps://github.com/MIBench/MIBench.github.io/blob/main/README.md. Xiaoyan Zhu 0005, Moxuan Zeng, Qingyang Zhao, Chunhui Huang, Suyu An, Yangzhong Wang, Xinghui Yue, Zhipeng He 0006, Weihao Guo, Kuo Shen, Peng Liu 0005, Lan Zhang 0008, Jianfeng Ma 0001, Yuqing Zhang 0001 |
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. | 8 |