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Pedram Zaree

dblp:352/4841 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Security and privacy of machine learning · 88% Systems and software security · 12%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Trustworthy machine learning · 100%
Human-computer interaction and pervasive computing
1 paper
Immersive interaction · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › interpretability › mechanistic interpretability
attention intervention
0.912025
Attention Eclipse: Manipulating Attention to Bypass LLM Safety-Alignment · EMNLP 2025
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness
0.912025
Attention Eclipse: Manipulating Attention to Bypass LLM Safety-Alignment · EMNLP 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack
0.912025
Attention Eclipse: Manipulating Attention to Bypass LLM Safety-Alignment · EMNLP 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
jailbreak attack
0.912025
Attention Eclipse: Manipulating Attention to Bypass LLM Safety-Alignment · EMNLP 2025
Immersive interaction › augmented reality
multi-user augmented reality
0.812024
That Doesn't Go There: Attacks on Shared State in Multi-User Augmented Reality Applications · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Systems and software security
application security
0.212024
That Doesn't Go There: Attacks on Shared State in Multi-User Augmented Reality Applications · USENIX Security Symposium 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

attention loss · 1.7adversarial prompt generation · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Attention Eclipse: Manipulating Attention to Bypass LLM Safety-Alignment
abstract
Recent research has shown that carefully crafted jailbreak inputs can induce large language models to produce harmful outputs, despite safety measures such as alignment.It is important to anticipate the range of potential Jailbreak attacks to guide effective defenses and accurate assessment of model safety.In this paper, we present a new approach for generating highly effective Jailbreak attacks that manipulate the attention of the model to selectively strengthen or weaken attention among different parts of the prompt.By harnessing attention loss, we develop more effective jailbreak attacks, that are also transferrable.The attacks amplify the success rate of existing Jailbreak algorithms, including GCG, AutoDAN, and ReNeLLM, while lowering their generation cost (for example, the amplified GCG attack achieves 91.2% ASR, vs. 67.9%for the original attack on Llama2-7B-chat/AdvBench, using less than a third of the generation time).Warning: This paper contains potentially harmful LLM-generated content.
Pedram Zaree, Md Abdullah Al Mamun, Quazi Mishkatul Alam, Yue Dong 0002, Ihsen Alouani, Nael B. Abu-Ghazaleh
EMNLP1
2024 That Doesn't Go There: Attacks on Shared State in Multi-User Augmented Reality Applications
Carter Slocum, Yicheng Zhang 0004, Erfan Shayegani, Pedram Zaree, Nael B. Abu-Ghazaleh, Jiasi Chen
USENIX Security Symposium4