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Xinqian Sun

dblp:352/6379 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2023
0009-0004-2034-5943ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Systems and software security · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers
Operating systems · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › exploitation
automated exploit generation
1.322023
AEM: Facilitating Cross-Version Exploitability Assessment of Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities · SP 2023
AEM: Facilitating Cross-Version Exploitability Assessment of Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities · SP 2023
Systems and software security › vulnerability analysis
exploitability assessment
1.322023
AEM: Facilitating Cross-Version Exploitability Assessment of Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities · SP 2023
AEM: Facilitating Cross-Version Exploitability Assessment of Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities · SP 2023
Systems and software security
exploitation
1.322023
AEM: Facilitating Cross-Version Exploitability Assessment of Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities · SP 2023
AEM: Facilitating Cross-Version Exploitability Assessment of Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities · SP 2023
Systems and software security
vulnerability analysis
1.322023
AEM: Facilitating Cross-Version Exploitability Assessment of Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities · SP 2023
AEM: Facilitating Cross-Version Exploitability Assessment of Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities · SP 2023
Operating systems › kernel
linux kernel
0.422023
AEM: Facilitating Cross-Version Exploitability Assessment of Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities · SP 2023
AEM: Facilitating Cross-Version Exploitability Assessment of Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities · SP 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

exploit migration · 2.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 AEM: Facilitating Cross-Version Exploitability Assessment of Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities
abstract
This paper studies the problem of cross-version exploitability assessment for Linux kernels. Specifically, given an exploit demonstrating the exploitability of a vulnerability on a specific kernel version, we aim to understand the exploitability of the same vulnerability on other kernel versions. To tackle cross-version exploitability assessment, automated exploit generation (AEG), a recently popular topic, is the only existing, applicable solution. However, AEG is not well-suited due to its template-driven nature and ignorance of the capabilities offered by the available exploit.In this work, we introduce a new method, automated exploit migration (AEM), to facilitate cross-version exploitability assessment for Linux kernels. The key insight of AEM is the observation that the strategy adopted by the exploit is often applicable to other exploitable kernel versions. Technically, we consider the kernel version where the exploit works as a reference and adjust the exploit to force the other kernel versions to align with the reference. This way, we can reproduce the exploiting behaviors on the other versions. To reduce the cost and increase the feasibility, we strategically identify execution points that truly affect the exploitation and only enforce alignment at those points. We have designed and implemented a prototype of AEM. In our evaluation of 67 cases where exploit migration is needed, our prototype successfully migrates the exploit for 56 cases, producing a success rate of 83.5%.
Zheyue Jiang, Yuan Zhang 0009, Jun Xu 0024, Xinqian Sun, Min Yang 0002
SP4
2023 AEM: Facilitating Cross-Version Exploitability Assessment of Linux Kernel Vulnerabilities
abstract
This paper studies the problem of cross-version exploitability assessment for Linux kernels. Specifically, given an exploit demonstrating the exploitability of a vulnerability on a specific kernel version, we aim to understand the exploitability of the same vulnerability on other kernel versions. To tackle cross-version exploitability assessment, automated exploit generation (AEG), a recently popular topic, is the only existing, applicable solution. However, AEG is not well-suited due to its template-driven nature and ignorance of the capabilities offered by the available exploit.In this work, we introduce a new method, automated exploit migration (AEM), to facilitate cross-version exploitability assessment for Linux kernels. The key insight of AEM is the observation that the strategy adopted by the exploit is often applicable to other exploitable kernel versions. Technically, we consider the kernel version where the exploit works as a reference and adjust the exploit to force the other kernel versions to align with the reference. This way, we can reproduce the exploiting behaviors on the other versions. To reduce the cost and increase the feasibility, we strategically identify execution points that truly affect the exploitation and only enforce alignment at those points. We have designed and implemented a prototype of AEM. In our evaluation of 67 cases where exploit migration is needed, our prototype successfully migrates the exploit for 56 cases, producing a success rate of 83.5%.
Zheyue Jiang, Yuan Zhang 0009, Jun Xu 0024, Xinqian Sun, Min Yang 0002
SP4