Scientific texts convey new and complex information relevant not only to researchers but also to lay audiences. We present a randomized controlled trial that investigated whether showing a concept map, gradually building up as a user reads a scientific text, supports the cognitive processes of knowledge construction. The intervention group (n = 44) exhibited significantly more knowledge construction [t(89) = 1.94, p = .029, d = 0.41] than the control group (n = 47). The intervention supported basic knowledge construction, i.e., simple processing of information, but not medium and complex levels. This study makes two contributions: (1) showing interactive concept maps and building them up gradually alongside reading helps make scientific texts cognitively more accessible to a lay audience, e.g., to inform public debate, and (2) knowledge construction theory can be used as a theoretical foundation for measuring specific aspects of learning processes—complementing other metrics for comparative design examinations, e.g., usability, user experience, or performance-based measures.

Modern superscalar CPUs have multiple execution units that independently execute operations from the instruction stream. Previous work has shown that numerous side channels exist around these out-of-order execution pipelines, particularly for an attacker running on an SMT core.In this paper, we present the SQUIP attack, the first side-channel attack on scheduler queues, which are critical for deciding the schedule of instructions to be executed in superscalar CPUs. Scheduler queues have not been explored as a side channel so far, as Intel CPUs only have a single scheduler queue, and contention thereof would be virtually the same as contention of the reorder buffer. However, the Apple M1, AMD Zen 2, and Zen 3 microarchitectures have separate scheduler queues per execution unit. We first reverse-engineer the behavior of the scheduler queues on these CPUs and show that they can be primed and probed. The SQUIP attack observes the occupancy level from within the same hardware core and across SMT threads. We evaluate the performance of the SQUIP attack in a covert channel, exfiltrating 0.89 Mbit/s from a co-located virtual machine at an error rate below 0.8 %, and 2.70 Mbit/s from a co-located process at an error rate below 0.8 %. We then demonstrate the side channel on an mbedTLS RSA signature process in a co-located process and in a co-located virtual machine. Our attack recovers full RSA-4096 keys with only 50 500 traces and less than 5 to 18 bit errors on average. Finally, we discuss mitigations necessary, especially for Zen 2 and Zen 3 systems, to prevent our attacks.