Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
JB Lanier
dblp:353/0793
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% | |
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Reinforcement learning · 100% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
multi-agent reinforcement learning |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Toward Optimal Policy Population Growth in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games · ICLR 2024 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning › multi-agent reinforcement learning › equilibrium learning
policy space response oracle |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Toward Optimal Policy Population Growth in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games · ICLR 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › equilibrium computation
double oracle algorithm |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Toward Optimal Policy Population Growth in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games · ICLR 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › solution concepts in games › equilibrium concepts
nash equilibrium |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Toward Optimal Policy Population Growth in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games · ICLR 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
zero-sum game |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Toward Optimal Policy Population Growth in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games · ICLR 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
self-play · 1.5exploitability reduction · 1.5
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Toward Optimal Policy Population Growth in Two-Player Zero-Sum GamesabstractIn competitive two-agent environments, deep reinforcement learning (RL) methods like Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) often increase exploitability between iterations, which is problematic when training in large games. To address this issue, we introduce anytime double oracle (ADO), an algorithm that ensures exploitability does not increase between iterations, and its approximate extensive-form version, anytime PSRO (APSRO). ADO converges to a Nash equilibrium while iteratively reducing exploitability. However, convergence in these algorithms may require adding all of a game's deterministic policies. To improve this, we propose Self-Play PSRO (SP-PSRO), which incorporates an approximately optimal stochastic policy into the population in each iteration. APSRO and SP-PSRO demonstrate lower exploitability and near-monotonic exploitability reduction in games like Leduc poker and Liar's Dice. Empirically, SP-PSRO often converges much faster than APSRO and PSRO, requiring only a few iterations in many games. Stephen McAleer, JB Lanier, Kevin A. Wang, Pierre Baldi, Tuomas Sandholm, Roy Fox |
ICLR | 2 |