Compute Express Link (CXL) offers byte-addressable, cache-coherent remote memory accesses across multiple hosts. Unfortunately, the CXL specification lacks mechanisms to ensure safe interoperability between heterogeneous host architectures with diverse cache coherence (CC) protocols and memory consistency models (MCMs). This semantic gap poses fundamental challenges and a significant barrier to adopting CXL in modern heterogeneous data centers.

We introduce$\mathbf{C}^{\mathbf{3}}$, a systematic methodology for designing Compute Express Link (CXL) coherence controllers, to overcome interoperability challenges that arise from the mismatch of coherence protocols and memory consistency models in heterogeneous CXL-connected systems. Crucially, CXL lacks a unified heterogeneous computing interface, which can lead to unpredictable and inconsistent behavior when multiple heterogeneous devices decide to share cache-coherent CXL memory. C$^{3}$acts as a pivotal interface between diverse heterogeneous compute units, bridging the semantic differences without necessitating disruptive changes to existing system architectures. Our approach hinges on two key principles: delegating memory operations across coherence domains and enforcing atomicity at domain boundaries, thereby preserving the native memory consistency model semantics of each unit. We implement$\mathbf{C}^{\mathbf{3}}$as a generic gem5 model and validate its correctness through exhaustive litmus testing. We also show that$\mathbf{C}^{\mathbf{3}}$incurs minimal performance overhead compared to unified native coherence protocols.

We introduce TNIC, a trusted NIC architecture for building trustworthy distributed systems deployed in heterogeneous, untrusted (Byzantine) cloud environments. TNIC builds a minimal, formally verified, silicon root-of-trust at the network interface level. We strive for three primary design goals: (1) a host CPU-agnostic unified security architecture by providing trustworthy network-level isolation; (2) a minimalistic and verifiable TCB based on a silicon root-of-trust by providing two core properties of transferable authentication and non-equivocation; and (3) a hardware-accelerated trustworthy network stack leveraging SmartNICs. Based on the TNIC architecture and associated network stack, we present a generic set of programming APIs and a recipe for building high-performance, trustworthy, distributed systems for Byzantine settings. We formally verify the safety and security properties of our TNIC while demonstrating its use by building four trustworthy distributed systems. Our evaluation of TNIC shows up to 6× performance improvement compared to CPU-centric TEE systems.

Today's modern hardware, with manycore servers, RDMA-capable networks and trusted execution environments, challenges the conventional wisdom about CFT protocols' design. We explore the synergy between modern hardware and the security and performance of strongly consistent replication protocols. Specifically, can we leverage (and how) modern cloud hardware to harden the security properties of a CFT protocol for Byzantine settings while achieving high performance?