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Hossein Moghaddas

dblp:353/7535 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
0009-0000-3377-0632ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Systems and software security · 44% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 44% Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 13%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptographic foundations › cryptographic commitments › polynomial commitment
lattice-based polynomial commitment
0.812024
Lattice-Based Polynomial Commitments: Towards Asymptotic and Concrete Efficiency · J. Cryptol. 2024
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptographic foundations › cryptographic commitments
polynomial commitment
0.812024
Lattice-Based Polynomial Commitments: Towards Asymptotic and Concrete Efficiency · J. Cryptol. 2024
Systems and software security › software protection
binary hardening
0.712023
ARMore: Pushing Love Back Into Binaries · USENIX Security Symposium 2023
Systems and software security
memory safety
0.712023
ARMore: Pushing Love Back Into Binaries · USENIX Security Symposium 2023
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
R1CS
0.212024
Lattice-Based Polynomial Commitments: Towards Asymptotic and Concrete Efficiency · J. Cryptol. 2024
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › proof systems › zero-knowledge proofs
succinct arguments
0.212024
Lattice-Based Polynomial Commitments: Towards Asymptotic and Concrete Efficiency · J. Cryptol. 2024
Systems and software security
exploitation
0.212023
ARMore: Pushing Love Back Into Binaries · USENIX Security Symposium 2023
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Lattice-Based Polynomial Commitments: Towards Asymptotic and Concrete Efficiency
abstract
Abstract Polynomial commitments schemes are a powerful tool that enables one party to commit to a polynomial p of degree d , and prove that the committed function evaluates to a certain value z at a specified point u , i.e. $$p(u) = z$$ p ( u ) = z , without revealing any additional information about the polynomial. Recently, polynomial commitments have been extensively used as a cryptographic building block to transform polynomial interactive oracle proofs (PIOPs) into efficient succinct arguments. In this paper, we propose a lattice-based polynomial commitment that achieves succinct proof size and verification time in the degree d of the polynomial. Extractability of our scheme holds in the random oracle model under a natural ring version of the BASIS assumption introduced by Wee and Wu (EUROCRYPT 2023). Unlike recent constructions of polynomial commitments by Albrecht et al. (CRYPTO 2022), and by Wee and Wu, we do not require any expensive preprocessing steps, which makes our scheme particularly attractive as an ingredient of a PIOP compiler for succinct arguments. We further instantiate our polynomial commitment, together with the PIOP (EUROCRYPT 2020), to obtain a publicly-verifiable trusted-setup succinct argument for Rank-1 Constraint System (R1CS). Performance-wise, we achieve $$17$$ 17 MB proof size for $$2^{20}$$ 2 20 constraints, which is $$15$$ 15 X smaller than currently the only publicly-verifiable lattice-based SNARK proposed by Albrecht et al.
Giacomo Fenzi, Hossein Moghaddas, Ngoc Khanh Nguyen 0001
J. Cryptol.2
2023 ARMore: Pushing Love Back Into Binaries
Luca Di Bartolomeo, Hossein Moghaddas, Mathias Payer
USENIX Security Symposium2