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Rodrigo Pedro

dblp:354/6269 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · unresolved

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 50% Security and privacy of machine learning · 50%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Language models and text generation · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning
prompt injection
0.912025
Prompt-to-SQL Injections in LLM-Integrated Web Applications: Risks and Defenses · ICSE 2025
Systems and software security › exploitation › injection attacks
SQL injection
0.912025
Prompt-to-SQL Injections in LLM-Integrated Web Applications: Risks and Defenses · ICSE 2025
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › large language model
large language model applications
0.312025
Prompt-to-SQL Injections in LLM-Integrated Web Applications: Risks and Defenses · ICSE 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

manual analysis · 1.7automated vulnerability discovery · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Prompt-to-SQL Injections in LLM-Integrated Web Applications: Risks and Defenses
abstract
Large Language Models (LLMs) have found widespread applications in various domains, including web applications with chatbot interfaces. Aided by an LLM-integration middleware such as LangChain, user prompts are translated into SQL queries used by the LLM to provide meaningful responses to users. However, unsanitized user prompts can lead to SQL injection attacks, potentially compromising the security of the database. In this paper, we present a comprehensive examination of prompt-to-SQL ($\mathbf{P}_{2} \mathbf{S Q L}$) injections targeting web applications based on frameworks such as LangChain and LlamaIndex. We characterize$\mathrm{P}_{2} \text{SQL}$injections, exploring their variants and impact on application security through multiple concrete examples. We evaluate seven state-of-the-art LLMs, demonstrating the risks of$P_{2}$SQL attacks across language models. By employing both manual and automated methods, we discovered$\mathrm{P}_{2} \text{SQL}$vulnerabilities in five real-world applications. Our findings indicate that LLMintegrated applications are highly susceptible to$\mathrm{P}_{2} \text{SQL}$injection attacks, warranting the adoption of robust defenses. To counter these attacks, we propose four effective defense techniques that can be integrated as extensions to the LangChain framework.
Rodrigo Pedro, Miguel E. Coimbra, Daniel Castro 0004, Paulo Carreira 0001, Nuno Santos 0001
ICSE1