Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Justin Yue
dblp:355/5794
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0002-5238-8548ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 since 2021Computer networks · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
3 papers |
Robot navigation and mapping · 57% Generative modeling · 22% Language models and text generation · 7% | |
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 73% Cyber-physical and IoT security · 27% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Internet of things and sensor networks · 100% |
Topics — the 12 heaviest of 12, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Robotics › Robot navigation and mapping › sensor fusion
LiDAR-camera-radar fusion |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Demo Abstract: Cooperative Multi-modal Sensing · SenSys 2025 |
Robotics › Robot navigation and mapping
sensor fusion |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Demo Abstract: Cooperative Multi-modal Sensing · SenSys 2025 |
Internet of things and sensor networks
wireless sensor network |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Demo Abstract: Cooperative Multi-modal Sensing · SenSys 2025 |
Cyber-physical and IoT security
autonomous vehicle security |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Can We Trust Embodied Agents? Exploring Backdoor Attacks against Embodied LLM-Based Decision-Making Systems · ICLR 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Can We Trust Embodied Agents? Exploring Backdoor Attacks against Embodied LLM-Based Decision-Making Systems · ICLR 2025 |
Machine learning › Generative modeling
diffusion model |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Intriguing Properties of Diffusion Models: An Empirical Study of the Natural Attack Capability in Text-to-Image Generative Models · CVPR 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Intriguing Properties of Diffusion Models: An Empirical Study of the Natural Attack Capability in Text-to-Image Generative Models · CVPR 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › adversarial attacks on generative models
diffusion-based adversarial attack |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Intriguing Properties of Diffusion Models: An Empirical Study of the Natural Attack Capability in Text-to-Image Generative Models · CVPR 2024 |
Robotics › Robot navigation and mapping
cooperative sensing |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Demo Abstract: Cooperative Multi-modal Sensing · SenSys 2025 |
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › LLM agents
LLM decision-making |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Can We Trust Embodied Agents? Exploring Backdoor Attacks against Embodied LLM-Based Decision-Making Systems · ICLR 2025 |
Robotics › Autonomous driving
perception |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Demo Abstract: Cooperative Multi-modal Sensing · SenSys 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Intriguing Properties of Diffusion Models: An Empirical Study of the Natural Attack Capability in Text-to-Image Generative Models · CVPR 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
word injection · 1.7synchronization · 1.7sensor calibration · 1.7scenario manipulation · 1.7knowledge injection · 1.7user study · 1.5text-to-image generation · 1.5
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Can We Trust Embodied Agents? Exploring Backdoor Attacks against Embodied LLM-Based Decision-Making SystemsabstractLarge Language Models (LLMs) have shown significant promise in real-world decision-making tasks for embodied artificial intelligence, especially when fine-tuned to leverage their inherent common sense and reasoning abilities while being tailored to specific applications. However, this fine-tuning process introduces considerable safety and security vulnerabilities, especially in safety-critical cyber-physical systems. In this work, we propose the first comprehensive framework for **B**ackdoor **A**ttacks against **L**LM-based **D**ecision-making systems (BALD) in embodied AI, systematically exploring the attack surfaces and trigger mechanisms. Specifically, we propose three distinct attack mechanisms: *word injection*, *scenario manipulation*, and *knowledge injection*, targeting various components in the LLM-based decision-making pipeline. We perform extensive experiments on representative LLMs (GPT-3.5, LLaMA2, PaLM2) in autonomous driving and home robot tasks, demonstrating the effectiveness and stealthiness of our backdoor triggers across various attack channels, with cases like vehicles accelerating toward obstacles and robots placing knives on beds. Our word and knowledge injection attacks achieve nearly 100\% success rate across multiple models and datasets while requiring only limited access to the system. Our scenario manipulation attack yields success rates exceeding 65\%, reaching up to 90\%, and does not require any runtime system intrusion. We also assess the robustness of these attacks against defenses, revealing their resilience. Our findings highlight critical security vulnerabilities in embodied LLM systems and emphasize the urgent need for safeguarding these systems to mitigate potential risks. Ruochen Jiao, Shaoyuan Xie, Justin Yue, Takami Sato, Lixu Wang, Yixuan Wang 0001, Qi Alfred Chen, Qi Zhu 0002 |
ICLR | 3 |
| 2025 | Demo Abstract: Cooperative Multi-modal SensingabstractPractitioners face substantial challenges in building multi-modal platforms that are essential for autonomous systems' safe decision-making. Those complications, including synchronization, calibration, and tedious sensor validation, hinder user adoption for real-world applications. We present CMS, a Cooperative Multi-modal Sensing Platform. CMS provides one consistent interface, integrating LiDAR, camera, RaDAR, and GNSS/IMU, streamlines these processes and makes the intricacies transparent to users and applications. Our demonstration shows that CMS can obtain high-quality multi-modal sensor data, paving the way toward real-world prototypes of cooperative autonomous systems. Ruoshen Mo, Justin Yue, Dinesh Bharadia, Hang Qiu 0001 |
SenSys | 4 |
| 2024 | Intriguing Properties of Diffusion Models: An Empirical Study of the Natural Attack Capability in Text-to-Image Generative ModelsabstractDenoising probabilistic diffusion models have shown breakthrough performance to generate more photo-realistic images or human-level illustrations than the prior models such as GANs. This high image-generation capability has stimulated the creation of many downstream applications in various areas. However, we find that this technology is actually a double-edged sword: we identify a new type of attack, called the Natural Denoising Diffusion (NDD) attack based on the finding that state-of-the-art deep neural network (DNN) models still hold their prediction even if we intentionally remove their robust features, which are essential to the human visual system (HVS), through text prompts. The NDD attack shows a significantly high capability to generate low-cost, model-agnostic, and transferable adversarial attacks by exploiting the natural attack capability in diffusion models. To systematically evaluate the risk of the NDD attack, we perform a large-scale empirical study with our newly created dataset, the Natural Denoising Diffusion Attack (NDDA) dataset. We evaluate the natural attack capability by answering 6 research questions. Through a user study, we find that it can achieve an 88% detection rate while being stealthy to 93% of human subjects; we also find that the non-robust features embedded by diffusion models contribute to the natural attack capability. To confirm the model-agnostic and transferable attack capability, we perform the NDD attack against the Tesla Model 3 and find that 73% of the physically printed attacks can be detected as stop signs. Our hope is that the study and dataset can help our community be aware of the risks in diffusion models and facilitate further research toward robust DNN models. Takami Sato, Justin Yue, Nanze Chen, Ningfei Wang, Qi Alfred Chen |
CVPR | 2 |