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Man-Hsin Chen

dblp:355/8604 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0004-0265-7548ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 2 · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer networks
1 paper
Cellular and mobile networks · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cellular and mobile networks › cellular network security
denial of service attack
0.812024
IMS is Not That Secure on Your 5G/4G Phones · MobiCom 2024
Cellular and mobile networks
vulnerability discovery
0.812024
IMS is Not That Secure on Your 5G/4G Phones · MobiCom 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

proof-of-concept attack · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 When Mobile Equipment Security Lags Behind Infrastructure: Vulnerabilities, Attacks, and Countermeasures in IMS Services
Jingwen Shi, Min-Yue Chen, Sihan Wang 0002, Guan-Hua Tu, Tian Xie 0001, Yiwen Hu 0002, Man-Hsin Chen, Haitian Yan, Chi-Yu Li 0001, Chunyi Peng 0001
IEEE Trans. Netw.7
2024 IMS is Not That Secure on Your 5G/4G Phones
abstract
IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) is vital for delivering IP-based multimedia services in mobile networks. Despite constant upgrades by 3GPP over the past two decades to support heterogeneous radio access networks (e.g., 4G LTE, 5G NR, and Wi-Fi) and enhance IMS security, the focus has primarily been on cellular infrastructure. Consequently, IMS security measures on mobile equipment (ME), such as smartphones, lag behind rapid technological advancements. Our study reveals that mandated IMS security measures on ME fail to keep pace, resulting in new vulnerabilities and attack vectors, including denial of service (DoS) across all networks, named SMS source spoofing, and covert communications over Video-over-IMS attacks. All vulnerabilities and proof-of-concept attacks have been experimentally validated in operational 5G/4G networks across various phone models and network operators. Finally, we propose and prototype standard-compliant remedies for these vulnerabilities.
Jingwen Shi, Sihan Wang 0002, Min-Yue Chen, Guan-Hua Tu, Tian Xie 0001, Man-Hsin Chen, Yiwen Hu 0002, Chi-Yu Li 0001, Chunyi Peng 0001
MobiCom6