Repository-level code completion remains a challenging task for existing code large language models (code LLMs) due to their limited understanding of repository-specific context and domain knowledge. While retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) approaches have shown promise by retrieving relevant code snippets as cross-file context, they suffer from two fundamental problems: misalignment between the query and the target code in the retrieval process, and the inability of existing retrieval methods to effectively utilize the inference information. To address these challenges, we propose AlignCoder, a repository-level code completion framework that introduces a query enhancement mechanism and a reinforcement learning based retriever training method. Our approach generates multiple candidate completions to construct an enhanced query that bridges the semantic gap between the initial query and the target code. Additionally, we employ reinforcement learning to train an AlignRetriever that learns to leverage inference information in the enhanced query for more accurate retrieval. We evaluate AlignCoder on two widely-used benchmarks (CrossCodeEval and RepoEval) across five backbone code LLMs, demonstrating an 18.1% improvement in EM score compared to baselines on the CrossCodeEval benchmark. The results show that our framework achieves superior performance and exhibits high generalizability across various code LLMs and programming languages.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in code generation, by leveraging retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) methods. However, the computational costs associated with LLM inference, particularly in terms of latency and energy consumption, have received limited attention in the security context. This paper introduces DrainCode, the first adversarial attack targeting the computational efficiency of RAG-based code generation systems. By strategically poisoning retrieval contexts through mutation-based approach, DrainCode forces LLMs to produce significantly longer outputs, thereby increasing GPU latency and energy consumption. We evaluate the effectiveness of DrainCode across multiple models. Our experiments show that DrainCode achieves up to a 85% increase in latency, a 49% increase in energy consumption, and more than a 3× increase in output length compared to the baseline. Furthermore, we demonstrate the generalizability of the attack across different prompting strategies and its effectiveness compared to different defenses. The results highlight DrainCode as a potential method for increasing the computational overhead of LLMs, making it useful for evaluating LLM security in resource-constrained environments. We provide code and data at https://github.com/DeepSoftwareAnalytics/DrainCode.