Microcontroller systems are integral to our daily lives, powering mission-critical applications such as vehicles, medical devices, and industrial control systems. Therefore, it is essential to investigate and outline the challenges encountered in developing secure microcontroller systems. While previous research has focused solely on microcontroller firmware analysis to identify and characterize vulnerabilities, our study uniquely leverages data from the 2023 and 2024 MITRE eCTF team submissions and post-competition interviews. This approach allows us to dissect the entire lifecycle of secure microcontroller system development from both technical and perceptual perspectives, providing deeper insights into how these vulnerabilities emerge in the first place.

Recent studies regarding the COVID-19 pandemic have revealed the widespread propagation of hateful content during this period. While significant research has focused on COVID-19-related online hate in text (e.g., text-based tweets), the role of memes in propagating online hate during the pandemic has been largely overlooked. Memes are a popular mechanism used by Internet users to convey their thoughts and opinions on a variety of topics. However, memes have emerged as an important mechanism through which ideologically potent and hateful content spreads on social media platforms. In this work, we focus on investigating the role of memes in the propagation of online hate during the COVID-19 pandemic. We first collect a novel dataset of 4,001 COVID-19-related hateful memes and their replies over a 3-year period from Twitter. Then, we carry out the first large-scale investigation into the impact of these memes on Twitter users, by studying the psychological reactions of Twitter users to these memes using various text analysis methods. We find that COVID-19-related hateful memes have a significantly greater negative impact on Twitter users in comparison to text-based hateful tweets, and increasing negativity towards such memes over the 3-year period. Our new dataset of COVID-19-related hateful memes and findings from our work pave the way for studying the dissemination and moderation of COVID-19-related online hate through the medium of memes.

ARM Cortex-M is one of the most popular microcontroller architectures designed for embedded and Internet of Things (IoT) applications. To facilitate efficient execution, it has some unique hardware optimization. In particular, Cortex-M TrustZone has a fast state switch mechanism that allows direct control-flow transfer from the secure state program to the non-secure state userspace program. In this paper, we demonstrate how this fast state switch mechanism can be exploited for arbitrary code execution with escalated privilege in the non-secure state by introducing a new exploitation technique, namely return-to-non-secure (ret2ns). We experimentally confirmed the feasibility of four variants of ret2ns attacks on two Cortex-M hardware systems. To defend against ret2ns attacks, we design two address sanitizing mechanisms that have negligible performance overhead.