The use of machine learning (ML) models to assess and score textual data has become increasingly pervasive in an array of contexts including natural language processing, information retrieval, search and recommendation, and credibility assessment of online content. A significant disruption at the intersection of ML and text are text-generating large-language models (LLMs) such as generative pre-trained transformers (GPTs). We empirically assess the differences in how ML-based scoring models trained on human content assess the quality of content generated by humans versus GPTs. To do so, we propose an analysis framework that encompasses essay scoring ML models, human- and ML-generated essays, and a statistical model that parsimoniously considers the impact of type of respondent, prompt genre, and the ML model used for assessment model. A rich testbed is utilized that encompasses 18,460 human-generated and GPT-based essays. Results of our benchmark analysis reveal that LLMs and transformer pretrained language models (PLMs) more accurately score human essay quality as compared to CNN/RNN and feature-based ML methods. Interestingly, we find that LLMs and transformer PLMs tend to score GPT-generated text 10–20% higher on average, relative to human-authored documents. Conversely, traditional deep learning and feature-based ML models score human text considerably higher. Further analysis reveals that even though the LLMs and transformer PLMs are exclusively fine-tuned on human text, they more prominently attend to certain tokens appearing only in GPT-generated text, possibly (in part) due to familiarity/overlap in pre-training. Our framework and results have implications for text classification settings where automated scoring of text is likely to be disrupted by generative AI.

Fairness measurement is crucial for assessing algorithmic bias in various types of machine learning (ML) models, including ones used for search relevance, recommendation, personalization, talent analytics, and natural language processing. However, the fairness measurement paradigm is currently dominated by fairness metrics that examine disparities in allocation and/or prediction error as univariate key performance indicators (KPIs) for a protected attribute or group. Although important and effective in assessing ML bias in certain contexts such as recidivism, existing metrics don’t work well in many real-world applications of ML characterized by imperfect models applied to an array of instances encompassing a multivariate mixture of protected attributes, that are part of a broader process pipeline. Consequently, the upstream representational harm quantified by existing metrics based on how the model represents protected groups doesn’t necessarily relate to allocational harm in the application of such models in downstream policy/decision contexts. We propose FAIR-Frame, a model-based framework for parsimoniously modeling fairness across multiple protected attributes in regard to the representational and allocational harm associated with the upstream design/development and downstream usage of ML models. We evaluate the efficacy of our proposed framework on two testbeds pertaining to text classification using pretrained language models. The upstream testbeds encompass over fifty thousand documents associated with twenty-eight thousand users, seven protected attributes and five different classification tasks. The downstream testbeds span three policy outcomes and over 5.41 million total observations. Results in comparison with several existing metrics show that the upstream representational harm measures produced by FAIR-Frame and other metrics are significantly different from one another, and that FAIR-Frame’s representational fairness measures have the highest percentage alignment and lowest error with allocational harm observed in downstream applications. Our findings have important implications for various ML contexts, including information retrieval, user modeling, digital platforms, and text classification, where responsible and trustworthy AI is becoming an imperative.