EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Jonata Pastro
dblp:358/8080
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2023
0009-0007-5328-9011ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Systems and software security · 50% Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 50% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper |
Program analysis · 50% Program verification · 50% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Systems and software security › software vulnerability
cryptographic API misuse |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Runtime Verification of Crypto APIs: An Empirical Study · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2023 |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security
runtime verification |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Runtime Verification of Crypto APIs: An Empirical Study · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2023 |
Program analysis
dynamic analysis |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Runtime Verification of Crypto APIs: An Empirical Study · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2023 |
Program verification › dynamic verification
runtime verification |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Runtime Verification of Crypto APIs: An Empirical Study · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2023 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
static analysis · 1.3runtime verification · 1.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2023 | Runtime Verification of Crypto APIs: An Empirical StudyabstractMisuse of cryptographic (crypto) APIs is a noteworthy cause of security vulnerabilities. For this reason, static analyzers were recently proposed for detecting crypto API misuses. They differ in strengths and weaknesses, and they might miss bugs. Motivated by the inherent limitations of static analyzers, this article reports on a study of runtime verification (RV) as a dynamic-analysis-based alternative for crypto API misuse detection. RV monitors program runs against formal specifications; it was shown to be effective and efficient for amplifying the bug-finding ability of software tests. We focus on the popular JCA crypto API and write 22 RV specifications based on expert-validated rules in a static analyzer. We monitor these specifications while running tests in five benchmarks. Lastly, we compare the accuracy of our RV-based approach, RVSec, with those of three state-of-the-art crypto API misuses detectors: CogniCrypt, CryptoGuard, and CryLogger. Results show that RVSec has higher accuracy in four benchmarks and is on par with CryptoGuard in the fifth. Overall, RVSec achieves an average${\boldsymbol{F}}_{1}$measure of 95%, compared with 83%, 78%, and 86% for CogniCrypt, CryptoGuard, and CryLogger, respectively. We highlight the strengths and limitations of these tools and show that RV is effective for detecting crypto API misuses. We also discuss how static and dynamic analysis can complement each other for detecting crypto API misuses. Adriano Torres, Pedro Henrique Teixeira Costa, Luis Henrique Vieira Amaral, Jonata Pastro, Rodrigo Bonifácio, Marcelo d'Amorim, Owolabi Legunsen, Eric Bodden, Edna Dias Canedo |
IEEE Trans. Software Eng. | 4 |