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Jonata Pastro

dblp:358/8080 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2023
0009-0007-5328-9011ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 50% Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 50%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program analysis · 50% Program verification · 50%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › software vulnerability
cryptographic API misuse
0.712023
Runtime Verification of Crypto APIs: An Empirical Study · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2023
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security
runtime verification
0.712023
Runtime Verification of Crypto APIs: An Empirical Study · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2023
Program analysis
dynamic analysis
0.712023
Runtime Verification of Crypto APIs: An Empirical Study · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2023
Program verification › dynamic verification
runtime verification
0.712023
Runtime Verification of Crypto APIs: An Empirical Study · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

static analysis · 1.3runtime verification · 1.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 Runtime Verification of Crypto APIs: An Empirical Study
abstract
Misuse of cryptographic (crypto) APIs is a noteworthy cause of security vulnerabilities. For this reason, static analyzers were recently proposed for detecting crypto API misuses. They differ in strengths and weaknesses, and they might miss bugs. Motivated by the inherent limitations of static analyzers, this article reports on a study of runtime verification (RV) as a dynamic-analysis-based alternative for crypto API misuse detection. RV monitors program runs against formal specifications; it was shown to be effective and efficient for amplifying the bug-finding ability of software tests. We focus on the popular JCA crypto API and write 22 RV specifications based on expert-validated rules in a static analyzer. We monitor these specifications while running tests in five benchmarks. Lastly, we compare the accuracy of our RV-based approach, RVSec, with those of three state-of-the-art crypto API misuses detectors: CogniCrypt, CryptoGuard, and CryLogger. Results show that RVSec has higher accuracy in four benchmarks and is on par with CryptoGuard in the fifth. Overall, RVSec achieves an average${\boldsymbol{F}}_{1}$measure of 95%, compared with 83%, 78%, and 86% for CogniCrypt, CryptoGuard, and CryLogger, respectively. We highlight the strengths and limitations of these tools and show that RV is effective for detecting crypto API misuses. We also discuss how static and dynamic analysis can complement each other for detecting crypto API misuses.
Adriano Torres, Pedro Henrique Teixeira Costa, Luis Henrique Vieira Amaral, Jonata Pastro, Rodrigo Bonifácio, Marcelo d'Amorim, Owolabi Legunsen, Eric Bodden, Edna Dias Canedo
IEEE Trans. Software Eng.4