Ronik Bhaskar

dblp:359/4253 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0002-7524-9292ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 3 · 3 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 On the Feasibility of Poisoning Text-to-Image AI Models via Adversarial Mislabeling
abstract
Today's text-to-image generative models are trained on millions of images sourced from the Internet, each paired with a detailed caption produced by Vision-Language Models (VLMs). This part of the training pipeline is critical for supplying the models with large volumes of high-quality image-caption pairs during training. However, recent work suggests that VLMs are vulnerable to stealthy adversarial attacks, where adversarial perturbations are added to images to mislead the VLMs into producing incorrect captions.
Stanley Wu, Ronik Bhaskar, Anna Yoo Jeong Ha, Shawn Shan, Haitao Zheng 0001, Ben Y. Zhao
CCS2
2024 Organic or Diffused: Can We Distinguish Human Art from AI-generated Images?
abstract
The advent of generative AI images has completely disrupted the art world. Distinguishing AI generated images from human art is a challenging problem whose impact is growing over time. A failure to address this problem allows bad actors to defraud individuals paying a premium for human art and companies whose stated policies forbid AI imagery. It is also critical for content owners to establish copyright, and for model trainers interested in curating training data in order to avoid potential model collapse. There are several different approaches to distinguishing human art from AI images, including classifiers trained by supervised learning, research tools targeting diffusion models, and identification by professional artists using their knowledge of artistic techniques. In this paper, we seek to understand how well these approaches can perform against today's modern generative models in both benign and adversarial settings. We curate real human art across 7 styles, generate matching images from 5 generative models, and apply 8 detectors (5 automated detectors and 3 different human groups including 180 crowdworkers, 3800+ professional artists, and 13 expert artists experienced at detecting AI). Both Hive and expert artists do very well, but make mistakes in different ways (Hive is weaker against adversarial perturbations while Expert artists produce higher false positives). We believe these weaknesses will persist, and argue that a combination of human and automated detectors provides the best combination of accuracy and robustness.
Anna Yoo Jeong Ha, Josephine Passananti, Ronik Bhaskar, Shawn Shan, Reid Southen, Haitao Zheng 0001, Ben Y. Zhao
CCS3
2024 Can Virtual Reality Protect Users from Keystroke Inference Attacks?
Zhuolin Yang 0001, Zain Sarwar, Iris Hwang, Ronik Bhaskar, Ben Y. Zhao, Haitao Zheng 0001
USENIX Security Symposium4