EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Maximilian Tölle
dblp:359/9053
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Reinforcement learning · 67% Multi-agent systems · 33% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning › robust reinforcement learning
adversarial reinforcement learning |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning via Bounded Rationality Curricula · ICLR 2024 |
Knowledge, reasoning and agents › Multi-agent systems › game theory
nash equilibrium |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning via Bounded Rationality Curricula · ICLR 2024 |
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
robust reinforcement learning |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning via Bounded Rationality Curricula · ICLR 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
quantal response equilibrium · 0.8entropy regularization · 0.8curriculum learning · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning via Bounded Rationality CurriculaabstractRobustness against adversarial attacks and distribution shifts is a long-standing goal of Reinforcement Learning (RL). To this end, Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) trains a protagonist against destabilizing forces exercised by an adversary in a competitive zero-sum Markov game, whose optimal solution, i.e., rational strategy, corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. However, finding Nash equilibria requires facing complex saddle point optimization problems, which can be prohibitive to solve, especially for high-dimensional control. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for adversarial RL based on entropy regularization to ease the complexity of the saddle point optimization problem. We show that the solution of this entropy-regularized problem corresponds to a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), a generalization of Nash equilibria that accounts for bounded rationality, i.e., agents sometimes play random actions instead of optimal ones. Crucially, the connection between the entropy-regularized objective and QRE enables free modulation of the rationality of the agents by simply tuning the temperature coefficient. We leverage this insight to propose our novel algorithm, Quantal Adversarial RL (QARL), which gradually increases the rationality of the adversary in a curriculum fashion until it is fully rational, easing the complexity of the optimization problem while retaining robustness. We provide extensive evidence of QARL outperforming RARL and recent baselines across several MuJoCo locomotion and navigation problems in overall performance and robustness. Aryaman Reddi, Maximilian Tölle, Jan Peters 0001, Georgia Chalvatzaki, Carlo D'Eramo |
ICLR | 2 |